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Advancing University Innovation: More Must Be 
Expected—More Must Be Done 
John E. Tyler III* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Far too much otherwise usable university research fails to 
find its way to advanced stages of research, commercial 
products, or other uses.1  Given the fundamental nature of 
much university research, a certain amount of this research 
will appropriately reach its potential with publication and 
                                                          
© 2009 John E. Tyler III. 
* John E. Tyler III is the General Counsel and Secretary for the Ewing Marion 
Kauffman Foundation. He is also the Chair of the Board for the Kauffman 
Innovation Network, Inc., a 501(c)(3) organization begun as an outgrowth of 
the Foundation’s support of university efforts to advance university 
innovation. Among other things, KIN operates the iBridgeSM Network and Site 
(www.ibridgenetwork.org). This article is based on plenary addresses Mr. 
Tyler has given at the invitation of the European Association of Science and 
Technology Transfer Professionals, the Max Planck Institute and the Indian 
Institute of Science, and at Howard Hughes Medical Institute. The author is 
particularly grateful for the review, suggestions, and encouragement of Craig 
Alexander, Laura Butzel, Connie Collingsworth, Erik Iverson, Stephanie 
Lovett, Ken Lynn, Lesa Mitchell, Laura Paglione, Carl Schramm, Andrea 
Sellers, and Dane Stangler. Mr. Tyler also greatly appreciates the work of 
those from the University of Minnesota Law School who read, commented on, 
edited, cite checked, and otherwise helped make this article better. 
 1. See PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCIENCE AND 
TECHNOLOGY, REPORT ON TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER OF FEDERALLY FUNDED 
R&D: FINDINGS AND PROPOSED ACTIONS 7 (May 13, 2003) [hereinafter 
PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL 2003] (“[T]here is much technology resident in both 
sectors [university and industry] that is never commercialized.”); RICHARD 
LAMBERT & NICK BUTLER, THE FUTURE OF EUROPEAN UNIVERSITIES: 
RENAISSANCE OR DECAY? 16, 55–56 (2006); Thomas J. Siepmann, The Global 
Exportation of the U.S. Bayh-Dole Act, 30 U. DAYTON L. REV. 209, 214 (2004) 
(“Unfortunately, in some cases, scientific discoveries were left unused and 
unapplied.”); Marie C. Thursby, Introducing Technology Entrepreneurship to 
Graduate Education: An Integrative Approach, in UNIVERSITY 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: PROCESS, DESIGN, AND 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 211, 214 (Gary C. Libecap ed., 2005) (“[O]nly a 
fraction of inventions with commercial potential are disclosed.”); see also 
WENDY H. SCHACHT, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: USE OF FEDERALLY FUNDED 
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 11–17 (CRS Report for Congress, RL33527, 
July 19, 2007) [hereinafter SCHACHT, 33527] (arguing that the use of federal 
R&D results has remained restrained). 
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classroom instruction, but a substantial volume of these 
innovations instead deserves life in products, services, research 
tools and methodologies, and other uses.  Unfortunately, 
exploitation of university innovations does not seem to be what 
it could be and is significantly below its potential for evolving to 
later stages of research, advancing human welfare, and 
spurring economic growth.  Of course, there are success stories 
that should be celebrated, but when measured against potential 
and opportunity, much more must be expected from and more 
must be done by industry, government, universities, and their 
respective leaders. 
Congress has declared and reiterated that our country’s 
federal policy shall be to support and pursue the usefulness of 
the fruits of research conducted using federal money, including 
through increased collaboration between and among industry, 
universities, and government.2  Congress has expressly stated 
                                                          
 2. See Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act of 1980, 15 U.S.C. § 
3701(3) (2006) (“Cooperation among academia, Federal laboratories, labor, and 
industry, in such forms as technology transfer, personnel exchange, joint 
research projects, and others, should be renewed, expanded, and 
strengthened.”); 15 U.S.C. § 3701(8) (stating that there is a need for a 
comprehensive national policy to enhance technology transfer for commercial 
and public purposes, “including a strong national policy supporting domestic 
technology transfer and utilization of the science and technology resources of 
the Federal Government”); Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 (University and Small 
Business Patent Procedure Act of 1980), 35 U.S.C. § 200 (2006); Federal 
Technology Transfer Act of 1986, 15 U.S.C. § 3710 (2006) (amending the 
Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act of 1980); 15 U.S.C. § 271(b)(3) 
(stating the purpose of this chapter is ”to advance, through cooperative efforts 
among industries, universities, and government laboratories, promising 
research and development projects, which can be optimized by the private 
sector for commercial and industrial applications . . . .”) (referring to the 
National Technology Transfer Advancement Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-113, 
110 Stat. 775 (1996)); Cooperative Research and Technology Enhancement 
(CREATE) Act of 2004, Pub.L.No. 108-453 (amending 35 U.S.C. § 103(c) to 
address joint research agreements); Technology Transfer Commercialization 
Act of 2000, Pub.L.No. 106-404, § 2(1) (amending the Stevenson-Wydler 
Technology Innovation Act of 1980) (“[T]he importance of linking our 
unparalleled network of over 700 Federal laboratories and our Nation’s 
universities with United States industry continues to hold great promise for 
our future economic prosperity.”). 
Wendy Schacht, who researches and writes for the Congressional Research 
Service, has discussed these and other federal statutes as they relate to 
federal policy and advancing innovation. See WENDY H. SCHACHT, THE BAYH-
DOLE ACT: SELECTED ISSUES IN PATENT POLICY AND THE COMMERCIALIZATION 
OF TECHNOLOGY 7–8 (CRS Report for Congress, RL32076, Oct. 5, 2007) 
[hereinafter SCHACHT, 32076]; WENDY H. SCHACHT, INDUSTRIAL 
COMPETITIVENESS AND TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCEMENT: DEBATE OVER 
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that “[i]t is the continuing responsibility of the Federal 
Government to ensure the full use of the results of the Nation’s 
Federal investment in research and development.”3 
Historically, this policy applied most directly to research by 
federal laboratories involving military, energy, and space 
applications.4  More recently, the focus has broadened to 
embrace maximizing results of research that contributes to or 
can result in economic growth and advances in human welfare, 
beyond consumer-oriented derivatives of military, defense, and 
space technologies.5  The focus also has expanded to include 
universities and other institutions that receive federal research 
grants.  The most significant of the federal policy declarations 
in this regard is the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980.6 
As stated in the Act, among the reasons Congress passed 
Bayh-Dole were “to promote the utilization of inventions 
arising from federally supported research and development” 
and to ensure “the public availability of inventions made in the 
                                                          
GOVERNMENT POLICY 5-16 (CRS Report for Congress, RL33528 Aug. 1, 2007) 
[hereinafter SCHACHT, 33528]; WENDY H. SCHACHT, PATENT OWNERSHIP AND 
FEDERAL RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT (R&D): A DISCUSSION ON THE BAYH-
DOLE ACT AND THE STEVENSON-WYDLER ACT (CRS Report for Congress, 
RL30320, Dec. 11, 2000) [hereinafter SCHACHT, 30320]; 
SCHACHT, 33527, supra note 1, at 11–17. 
In addition, numerous states and local communities have been focusing on the 
economic development potential that can arise from properly exploiting the 
results of university-based research. See 15 U.S.C. § 3701(9) (“It is in the 
national interest to promote the adaption of technological innovations to State 
and local government uses.”); 15 U.S.C. § 3702(3) (stating the Act’s purposes 
includes “stimulating improved utilization of federally funded technology 
developments . . . by State and local governments and the private sector . . . .”); 
SCHACHT, 32076, supra, at 4–5; see also JERRY PAYTAS ET AL., UNIVERSITIES 
AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF INDUSTRY CLUSTERS (2004); LOUIS G. TORNATZKY 
ET AL., INNOVATION U.: NEW UNIVERSITY ROLES IN A KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY 
(2002); DIANE PALMINTERA, ACCELERATING ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
THROUGH UNIVERSITY TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER (2005); W.R. Coffman, et al., 
The Future of Technology Transfer at a Major Land Grant University: Report 
of the Cornell University Land Grant Panel on Technology Transfer, 6 IP 
STRATEGY TODAY 1, 3–7 (2003). 
 3. 15 U.S.C. § 3710(a)(1) (2000). 
 4. SCHACHT, 30320, supra note 2, at 6–7 (“[W]hile the major portion of 
total federal R&D spending has been in the defense arena, government-
financed work has led or contributed to new commercial products and 
processes, including, but not limited to, antibiotics, plastics, jet aircraft, 
computers, electronics, and genetically engineered drugs (e.g., insulin and 
human growth hormone).”); see also SCHACHT, 32076, supra note 2, at 2. 
 5. See 15 U.S.C. § 271(b)(3); 15 U.S.C. §§ 3701(3), (8), (9); 15 U.S.C. § 
3702(3); 15 U.S.C. § 3710; 35 U.S.C. § 200. 
 6. 35 U.S.C. § 200 (2006). 
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United States . . . .”7 Congress believed that these goals could 
be achieved most effectively by changing federal policy to 
uniformly allow institutions receiving federal research grants 
to own the resulting inventions and innovations, license them 
to others (even exclusively except for the general government 
license), generate revenue, and share the revenue with the 
researchers.8 
Prior to passage of the Act, there were twenty-six different 
federal agency policies about using the results of federally 
funded research.9  After the Act, there was one federal policy.10 
Consequently, responsibility for the results of federally funded 
research formally devolved from federal agencies to universities 
with a corresponding Congressional mandate to maximize the 
usefulness of such research results.  Certain universities have 
done well in fulfilling their duties, but many others could do 
                                                          
 7. Id.: 
It is the policy and objective of the Congress to use the patent system 
to promote the utilization of inventions arising from federally 
supported research or development; to encourage maximum 
participation of small business firms in federally supported research 
and development efforts; to promote collaboration between 
commercial concerns and nonprofit organizations, including 
universities; to ensure that inventions made by nonprofit 
organizations and small business firms are used in a manner to 
promote free competition and enterprise without unduly encumbering 
future research and discovery; to promote the commercialization and 
public availability of inventions made in the United States by United 
States industry and labor; to ensure that the Government obtains 
sufficient rights in federally supported inventions to meet the needs 
of the Government and protect the public against nonuse or 
unreasonable use of inventions; and to minimize the costs of 
administering policies in this area. 
 8. 35 U.S.C. §§ 200, 202(a), 202(c)(1)-(3), 202(c)(7)(B). 
 9. SCHACHT, 32076, supra note 2, at.2; see also SCHACHT, 30320, supra 
note 2, at 4. 
 10. SCHACHT, 32076, supra note 2, at 2; SCHACHT, 30320, supra note 2, at 
4 (The intent of the Bayh-Dole Act is to create “a single uniform national 
policy designed to cut down on bureaucracy and encourage private industry to 
utilize government funded inventions through the commitment of the risk 
capital necessary to develop such inventions to the point of commercial 
application.”) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 96-1307, pt. 1, at 3 (1980)); see also Sara 
Boettiger & Alan Bennett, The Bayh-Dole Act: Implications for Developing 
Countries, 46 IDEA 261, 278 (2006); Lorelei Ritchie de Larena, The Price of 
Progress: Are Universities Adding to the Cost?, 43 HOUS. L. REV. 1373, 1374, 
1437 (2007) (arguing that the Bayh-Dole Act standardized rules regarding 
ownership of intellectual property and was a clear improvement over the prior 
set of complex, non-uniform rules). 
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better or have not done so well.11 
Universities that seem to have been successful in 
advancing their innovations, whether before Bayh-Dole or after 
its enactment, have deployed different strategies and tactics for 
doing so, and there is much to be learned from their 
experiences and examples.  Contrary to what some appear to 
believe, the most important lessons from these universities are 
not necessarily to replicate their tactics.  Instead, the best 
lessons are those based on common characteristics these 
universities have in pursuing their advancing innovation 
efforts and, in the process, furthering federal policy. Among the 
characteristics these universities have in common are the 
following: 
a. an informed, realistic vision for using and advancing 
university innovation in ways that complement specific 
academic and research missions, beyond merely chasing 
revenue;12 
b. policies consistent with that vision and in furtherance of 
the Act’s broad mandates;13 and 
                                                          
 11. Gideon D. Markman et al., Entrepreneurship and University-Based 
Technology Transfer, 20 J. BUS. VENTURING 241 (2005) (discussing certain 
university technology transfer offices and evaluating their effectiveness); see 
also infra notes 12–19 and accompanying text about the revenue universities 
receive from advancing innovation activities, amounts spent on research, and 
ratios of spending per disclosure, new patent application, and patent issued. 
 12. As discussed below, such a vision should reflect the university’s 
knowledge of its specific research strengths, personnel, and resources. The 
vision should also ensure that advancing innovation appropriately 
complements the university’s core missions of teaching and research and does 
not sacrifice general service to human welfare and economic growth, which 
requires a realistic perspective on the role of revenue. See, e.g., PRESIDENT’S 
COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, UNIVERSITY-PRIVATE 
SECTOR RESEARCH PARTNERSHIPS IN THE INNOVATION ECONOMY 69 
(November 20, 2008) [hereafter PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL 2008] (regarding 
university-industry relationships, the Council determined that “[h]aving a 
clear vision from leadership . . . in developing and maintaining the 
partnership is vital for success” and  a key element or guiding principle 
common among successful university-industry collaborations is a “shared 
vision and clear expectations”). 
 13. This point is developed further below, but examples might include 
policies that permit different approaches to intellectual property ownership, 
use rights, and revenue; that allow for different approaches to risk allocation, 
including to the university, by addressing representations, warranties and 
indemnification in light of respective benefits to be gained, investments, 
ability to control, and overall exposure to downside losses. See Michael M. 
Crow, Building an Entrepreneurial University, in  MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE 
AND EWING MARION KAUFFMAN FOUNDATION, THE FUTURE OF THE RESEARCH 
UNIVERSITY: MEETING THE GLOBAL CHALLENGES OF THE 21ST CENTURY, at 27 
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c. behaviors that advance the universities’ innovations by 
pursuing that vision and implementing those policies.14 
Unlike other articles about Bayh-Dole or advancing 
university innovation,15 this article explores the links that 
should connect federal policy with the university’s vision and 
the corresponding policies which in turn should be realized 
through related practices and behaviors.  The absence or 
weakness of these links contribute to the unrealized potential 
of university innovations and are a reflection of how university 
leaders and their advisors have pursued or neglected federal 
policy and responsibilities under it.16 
                                                          
(2008) (explaining that Arizona State University has implemented policies 
that promote entrepreneurship and simplify moving “ideas into action” and 
that the University has “minimized” policies that discourage entrepreneurial 
behavior). 
 14. The following examples of behaviors that a university might consider, 
depending on its unique circumstances, are discussed in more depth below: 
factoring efforts to advance innovation (e.g., disclosures) in tenure decisions; 
measuring the success of innovations in terms other than purely economic; 
pursuing volume in the amount of knowledge advanced rather than income 
derived; or encouraging equity interests instead of licensing fees that may 
hamstring a developing organization’s cash flow. 
 15. There can be confusion about the terms “advancing innovation” and 
“technology transfer.”  Some people use “technology transfer” to refer more 
specifically to efforts to commercialize and the results of those efforts, 
frequently through patenting and licensing. Somewhat more broadly, others 
recognize that “technology transfer” may also encompass publication and other 
knowledge exchange media. In either of the latter contexts, “technology 
transfer” would be a subset of “advancing innovation” but the words are not 
synonymous. “Advancing innovation” seems to better reflect the broad 
mandate from Congress that universities maximize the usefulness of their 
innovations, not just commercialization of them (although commercialization 
should not be condemned or forgotten in the right circumstances). 
In the body of this article and narrative parts of the footnotes, I try to use 
“advancing innovation” to refer to the processes and strategies by which 
universities maximize the usefulness of the innovations, including but not 
limited to commercialization activities, that result from their researchers’ 
efforts in furtherance of the broader, fullest purposes of the Bayh-Dole Act. In 
parenthetical references in the footnotes, I use “technology transfer” more 
frequently because the authors cited use those words more often, and it can be 
difficult to discern whether the authors intend the words to mean 
commercialization, knowledge transfer, or Bayh-Dole’s broader purposes. 
Changing the author’s terminology in summarizing their points could be 
confusing and potentially distort their intended meaning. 
 16. Sara Boettiger & Alan B. Bennett, Bayh-Dole: If We Knew Then What 
We Know Now, 24 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 320, 320 (2006) (“[N]egative 
consequences of Bayh-Dole can be traced to the institutional policies 
structured to optimize institutional benefits and income, rather than to the 
Act itself.”); see also PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL 2008, supra note 12, at 28 
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This article first presents a context for university leaders 
and their advisors to appreciate the importance of universities 
advancing their innovations as a vital matter of national 
interest, fulfilling an essential role in the new economy, and 
providing material educational benefits.  This section also 
discusses the reasons some posit to oppose advancing 
innovation, most notably the inevitable conflicts of interest and 
other ethical concerns that arise from university engagement 
with industry, which is inherent in advancing innovation 
activities.  Finally, the first section concludes with perspectives 
on ways to manage ethical matters, which Congress must have 
intended by promulgating federal policy that mandates 
university-industry interaction. 
The article next summarizes debate about the Bayh-Dole 
Act’s effectiveness as federal policy and why some mistakenly 
attribute failures in advancing innovation to the Act instead of 
to how the Act has been implemented by university leaders and 
policy makers.  The article then considers the importance of a 
customized institutional vision for advancing innovation that 
complements academic and research missions, is informed by 
knowledge of the specific university itself, and reflects a proper 
perspective on revenue potential and risk allocation.  Finally, 
the article concludes by relating how that unique vision should 
consistently inform university policies and behaviors regarding 
such legal and practical topics as intellectual property 
strategies, allocating liability, invention disclosures, and 
measures of success. 
It would be naïve to suggest that inadequacy of results in 
advancing university innovation rests wholly with universities 
or how leaders and their advisors steward such efforts. 
Industry is not without responsibility.  Other factors also 
contribute—most notably the lack of available funds.  For 
example, research suggests that capital is inadequate to bridge 
the “valley of death” for many potential products and otherwise 
useful innovations at intermediate stages of the 
                                                          
(“successful technology transfer negotiations often depend on individual 
efforts, particularly those of the leadership, from each organization having a 
strong desire to establish partnerships”); PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL 2008, supra 
note 12, at 29 (negotiations could be shorter and less time consuming “if a few 
key factors were present, such as continued commitment from leadership”); 
Crow, supra note 13, at 26–27 (“Many universities have a wide range of such 
constraints [on entrepreneurial behavior]—the kinds of policies that can 
inhibit decision-making, deaden creative thinking, and turn deans into paper-
pushers.”). 
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commercialization process.17 Industry behavior, the valley of 
death, and other factors that inhibit whether and how 
university innovations advance should not interfere with efforts 
to scrutinize and encourage change in university approaches, 
including by expanding vision to correspond to the broad 
purposes of Bayh-Dole and implementing corresponding 
policies and behaviors beyond hoped for financial gains. 
This article focuses on certain factors within the control of 
university leaders and their advisors, many of whom are from 
the legal profession, and should not be construed as forgiving or 
ignoring the need to address other factors that interfere with 
advancing university innovations to their potential.  The focus 
on university leaders and their advisors is intended to facilitate 
fulfillment of their responsibilities under federal policy and as 
stewards of federal grant dollars, hopefully resulting in fewer 
orphaned innovations, better opportunities for economic 
growth, and expanded human welfare. 
II. CONTEXT FOR ADVANCING UNIVERSITY 
INNOVATION 
The more traditional roles of universities in teaching and 
basic research are critical means by which universities advance 
knowledge, pursue innovation, and contribute to the well-being 
of society, and this article is not intended to detract from the 
importance of those contributions.18  Instead, this article 
                                                          
 17. See, e.g., GEORGE S. FORD ET AL., A VALLEY OF DEATH IN THE 
INNOVATION SEQUENCE: AN ECONOMIC INVESTIGATION 1 (2007); Phillip 
Auerswald & Lewis M. Branscomb, Valleys of Death and Darwinian Seas: 
Financing the Invention to Innovation Transition in the United States, 28 J. 
TECH. TRANSFER 227 (2003); Charles W. Wessner, Driving Innovations Across 
the Valley of Death, 48  RES. TECH. MGT. 9 (2005). 
 18. See CREST OMC EXPERT GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL PROP., 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: COLLABORATION BETWEEN PUBLICLY FUNDED 
RESEARCH ORGANISATIONS AND INDUSTRY AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 
TRAINING 26 (2006) [hereinafter CREST REPORT], available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/invest-in-research/pdf/download_en/crestreport.pdf; see also 
Mark Crowell, The Changing Face of University Technology Transfer, in 
EWING MARION KAUFFMAN FOUNDATION, KAUFFMAN FOUNDATION 
THOUGHTBOOK  2005, at 108 (2005) (roles of university are teaching, research, 
public service, and economic development); ANNA S. NILSSON ET AL., 
COMMERCIALIZATION OF LIFE-SCIENCE RESEARCH AT UNIVERSITIES IN THE 
UNITED STATES, JAPAN AND CHINA 11 (2006), available at 
http://www.itps.se/Archive/Documents/Swedish/Publikationer/Rapporter/Allm
%E4nna/A2006/A2006_006%20webb.pdf  (primary missions of universities to 
“create and disseminate knowledge by teaching and performing research” but 
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focuses more specifically on university service and 
responsibility in light of the purposes stated in the Bayh-Dole 
Act. Before delving more deeply into a discussion about how 
universities implement the Act, it is important to understand 
the context in which university undertake efforts to advance 
their innovations. 
This section discusses the role of advancing innovation in 
the new economy and the importance of that role as a matter of 
our nation’s economic and human welfare.  This section also 
identifies educational benefits gained from university efforts in 
this regard. Finally, this section presents the primary positions 
against advancing innovation and a rebuttal that managing 
ethical problems, rather than capitulating to them or isolating 
oneself from them, can simultaneously protect academic 
integrity and ensure that innovations are utilized. 
A. NEW ECONOMY AND NEW IMPORTANCE FOR UNIVERSITY 
INNOVATIONS 
Innovations derived from universities, hospitals, and 
research institutions—referred to collectively in this article as 
“universities”—have transformed our communities, nation, and 
our world in exciting and fulfilling ways. Although university 
innovations have contributed much to economic opportunity 
and human welfare over the past century,19 the outcomes often 
have been byproducts of an alternative purpose, such as 
military defense or space exploration.  A new reality has 
evolved in recent decades in which universities pursuing their 
research missions are now positioned to catalyze innovation 
and economic growth and improve the human condition.20  This 
                                                          
also contribute to innovation process through education and training, adding 
to stock of codified knowledge, increase local capacity for problem solving, and 
provide public space for conversations on development pathways and new 
knowledge). 
 19. See 15 U.S.C. § 3701(2) (“Technology and industrial innovation offer 
an improved standard of living, increased public and private sector 
productivity, creation of new industries and employment opportunities, 
improved public services and enhanced competitiveness of United States 
products in world markets.”); SCHACHT, 30320, supra note 2, at 9 (Technology 
transfer “can generate economic growth in the form of new jobs, [and] greater 
productivity.”); DAVID C. MOWERY ET AL., IVORY TOWER AND INDUSTRIAL 
INNOVATION: UNIVERSITY-INDUSTRY TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER BEFORE AND 
AFTER THE BAYH-DOLE ACT IN THE UNITED STATES 7, 12–13, 15–19 (2004). 
 20. See LAMBERT & BUTLER, supra note 1, at 15 (noting how universities 
should not be managed to improve use of resources); see also Thursby, supra 
note 1, at 212 (“University discoveries and inventions are increasingly 
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university role has gained significance as large corporations 
have jettisoned or changed the foci of their internal 
laboratories.21 
Wendy Schacht, a member of the Congressional Research 
Service who has written extensively for Congress on advancing 
university innovation, characterizes federal research and 
development grant money as serving a “critical national need”22 
and being “vital to the nation’s welfare and security”23 because 
of the economic growth derived from the commercialization of 
the results of federally funded research.24  Moreover, she 
                                                          
becoming the engine of entrepreneurship and technological advance for start-
ups and established companies.”); G. Pascal Zachary, Corporate Labs 
Disappear. Academia Steps In., N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2007, at §3; cf. 15 U.S.C. 
§ 3701(3) (“Many new discoveries and advances in science occur in universities 
and Federal laboratories.”); see also PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL 2008, supra note 
12, at 1 (“[u]niversities continue to serve as a primary engine for discovery 
research that can lead to innovation”); PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL 2008, supra note 
12, at 5, 7 (strengthening and expanding university-private sector 
relationships is “vital” to continued innovation and the “health of U.S. 
[research and development], and ultimately to the technology-based 
economy”); PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL 2008, supra note 12, at 37 (such 
relationships “are one vital element of the U.S. innovation ecosystem” and is 
increasingly important in light of “long-term Federal funding trends and 
increased global competition”); Crow, supra note 13, at 11 (the roughly 150 
public and private “research extensive” universities” are “the institutions that 
increasingly fuel the national economy by producing leaders in all sectors of 
academia, business, industry, and government, and through perpetual 
innovation in products and processes”); Crow, supra note 13, at 18 (higher 
education “is the source of economic growth and advances in our society. Our 
colleges and universities play a key role in ensuring that, as a nation, we will 
continue to lead the world in innovation, maintain our competitive advantage, 
and weave the fabric of economic prosperity.”). 
 21. See David Rotman, Special Report: R &D ‘04: Technology Review’s 
Annual Look At Corporate Research Trends And Numbers Including The R &D 
Spending Of 150 Top Technology Companies, Plus Profiles Of Three Hot 
Research Project, in TECHNOLOGY REVIEW (2004), available at 
http://www.technologyreview.com/computing/13988/?a=f; The Rise and Fall of 
Corporate R&D, ECONOMIST, Mar. 1, 2007, available at 
http://globaltechforum.eiu.com/index.asp?layout=rich_story&doc_id=10225&tit
le=The+rise+and+fall+of+corporate+R%26D&categoryid=15&channelid=5; see 
also PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL 2008, supra note 12, at 1 (noting trend of industry 
to reduce basic research, “notably the disappearance of Bell Labs”); 
PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL 2008, supra note 12, at 5 (reduced number and size of 
industry labs forces more reliance on academic and government labs for basic 
research output). 
 22. SCHACHT, 33528, supra note 2, at 7. 
 23. SCHACHT, 33527, supra note 1, at 3. 
 24. SCHACHT, 33528, supra note 2, at 7; SCHACHT, 33527, supra note 1, at 
3; PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL 2008, supra note 12, at 5; see also Crow, supra note 
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asserts that “[n]ational security is now being redefined to 
include economic well-being in addition to weapons 
superiority.”25 
The economic model that existed previously in the United 
States and much of the developed world was driven by a 
triumvirate of government, big business, and unions focused on 
industrial or manufacturing activities.26  The United States, 
European Union, India, parts of Asia, and elsewhere, however, 
have moved into a different economic dynamic. In the new, 
entrepreneurial economy of the United States and elsewhere, 
universities and entrepreneurs have joined government and big 
business as the key players, and knowledge and service are the 
essential ingredients.27  In this new paradigm, university 
research and its potential contribute to advancing quality of life 
through the development of new products and services, new 
ways of providing services, new approaches to productivity and 
efficiency, new jobs, and new sources of capital.28 
Federal policy and duty to society obligate research 
universities to maximize the potential for their innovations 
because they are integral to the new economy.  They should 
fulfill that obligation in a way that reflects the new, 
entrepreneurial economy.  To the extent vestiges of the old 
economy and its linear processes and measures remain in 
university policies and practices, opportunities for 
                                                          
13, at 30 (“It is essential to realize that continued economic growth depends 
upon innovation and that the global economy operates according to the forces 
of ‘creative destruction,’ described by economist Joseph Schumpeter nearly a 
century ago.”). 
 25. SCHACHT, 33527, supra note 1, at 15; see also Crow, supra note 13, at 
30 (“It is incumbent on universities as never before to help solve the pressing 
global issues of our time: population growth, climate change, national and 
international security.”). 
 26. See TORNATZKY ET AL., supra, note 2; CARL J. SCHRAMM, THE 
ENTREPRENEURIAL IMPERATIVE 24 (2006). 
 27. See David B. Audretsch et al., The Knowledge Spillover Theory of 
Entrepreneurship and Technological Diffusion, in UNIVERSITY 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: PROCESS, DESIGN, AND 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 69, 84 (Gary C. Libecap ed. 2005) (distinguishing 
neoclassical tradition focus on investment in physical capital from the 
endogenous growth theory focused on accumulated knowledge or knowledge 
capital). 
 28. See SCHACHT, 33528, supra note 2, at 2; see also supra note 16 and 
accompanying text; cf.  SCHRAMM, supra note 26, at 152 (“Our economic 
growth depends more and more on the success of our research institutions. 
Constant innovation and the entropic expansion of knowledge place enormous 
demands on universities.”). 
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contributions to economic growth, human welfare, and other 
benefits are likely to be imperiled. 
B. EDUCATIONAL BENEFITS OF ADVANCING UNIVERSITY 
INNOVATION 
People frequently consider money as the primary benefit to 
a university that advances its innovations, but money may be 
among the least important.  Yes, revenue is available from 
royalties, license fees, equity positions and options, and 
sponsored research.  In addition, success and good experiences 
can increase donations from alumni and others associated with 
the university experience, which can enhance labs, facilities, 
equipment, endowed chairs, and more.29  However, there are 
direct benefits to the university’s core academic mission, too. 
Evidence suggests that when universities engage well with 
business and strive to maximize their innovation potential, 
faculty, students, and the university itself can experience 
profound educational benefits.30 
For faculty, the experience of engaging with industry while 
advancing innovations can enhance professional development 
and lead to coaching or mentoring relationships and other 
experiences that benefit them in the lab and the classroom.31  
                                                          
 29. See PALMINTERA, supra, note 2 (Among the ways industry can help 
universities are by funding laboratories and equipment, sponsoring research, 
endowing chairs, serving on advisory boards, mentoring researchers and 
students, providing opportunities for student interns and CEO-in-residence 
program; moreover, these interactions and exchanges facilitate the flow of 
information between academia and the so called “real world,” thereby 
strengthening both; industry benefits by increased access to innovation, 
students, employees, and knowledge.); see also Donald Siegel et al., Assessing 
the Impact of Organizational Practices on the Productivity of University 
Technology Transfer Offices: An Exploratory Study, 32 RESEARCH POL’Y 27, 
31(2003) [hereinafter Siegel Study]; Markman et al., supra note 11, at 255; 
PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL 2008, supra note 12, at 71. 
 30. David C. Mowery, The Bayh-Dole Act and High-Technology 
Entrepreneurship in U.S. Universities: Chicken, Egg, or Something Else? in 
Colloquium on Entrepreneurship Education and Technology Transfer, 
University of Arizona 1 (2005); see also PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL 2003, supra note 
1, at 14; SCHACHT, 32076, supra note 2, at 4–5; Donald Siegel et al., 
Commercial Knowledge Transfers from Universities to Firms: Improving the 
Effectiveness of University-Industry Collaboration, 14 J. HIGH TECH. MGMT. 
RES. 111, 130 (2003); Siepmann, supra note 1, at 233. 
 31. DEREK BOK, UNIVERSITIES IN THE MARKETPLACE: THE 
COMMERCIALIZATION OF HIGHER EDUCATION 6–7 (2004); COUNCIL ON 
GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER IN U.S. RESEARCH 
UNIVERSITIES: DISPELLING COMMON MYTHS 3 (2000); Donald Siegel et al., 
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In the lab, researcher interactions with business might help 
them keep current with or get ahead of trends and recognize 
new, different opportunities for their existing or future 
research or its results.32  Researchers and faculty also might 
better understand valuation, development, and 
commercialization processes.33  In the classroom and as 
advisors, such faculty might have more credibility, be able to 
relate more tangibly to their students’ work aspirations, and 
provide a better window into real world content applications 
and processes. 
For students, hands-on research opportunities increase 
knowledge and marketability.  Working with professors who 
have commercialized innovations can improve what and how 
the students learn and can open doors for internships, 
fellowships, advanced education, and jobs—all of which also 
benefit industry and our society.34 
These interactions, between universities and industry, also 
contribute to the mutually beneficial social networks that 
facilitate research collaborations, shared ideas, healthy debate, 
                                                          
Toward a Model of the Effective Transfer of Scientific Knowledge from 
Academicians to Practitioners: Qualitative Evidence from the 
Commercialization of University Technologies, 21 J. ENGINEERING & TECH. 
MGMT. 115, 119 (2004); Audretsch, supra note 27; Markman et al., supra note 
11, at 255; Peter J. Harrington, Faculty Conflicts of Interest in an Age of 
Academic Entrepreneurialism: An Analysis of the Problem, the Law and 
Selected University Policies, 27 J.C. & U.L. 775, 786 (2001) (quoting A. Bartlett 
Giamatti); see also PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL 2008, supra note 12, at 61 (faculty 
can gain a better understanding of industry needs and the applications of their 
research); PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL 2008, supra note 12, at 71 (increases faculty 
professional development and better educates students through “faculty who 
can share these experiences” from interacting with industry). 
 32. Siegel, supra note 31, at 29–30; see also COUNCIL ON GOVERNMENTAL 
RELATIONS, supra note 31, at 16; Siegel, supra note 30, at 130; PRESIDENT’S 
COUNCIL 2008, supra note 12, at 71 (allows faculty research directions to be on 
the leading edge). 
 33. PALMINTERA, supra note 2, at 12. 
 34. COUNCIL ON GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, supra note 31, at 15–16; see 
also LAMBERT & BUTLER, supra note 1, at 57; PALMINTERA, supra note 2, at 
12; TORNATZKY ET AL., supra note 2, at 14; Gary Libecap, Introduction, in 
UNIVERSITY ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: PROCESS, 
DESIGN, AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ix (Gary Libecap ed., 2005); Siepmann, 
supra note 1, at 233; Zachary, supra note 20; see also PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL 
2008, supra note 12, at 61 (students have the opportunity to conduct research 
“highly relevant” to industry and to experience the “real world”); PRESIDENT’S 
COUNCIL 2008, supra note 12, at 71 (leads to internships and employment 
opportunities and industry personnel can provide assistance with student 
projects, serve on thesis committees, and guest lecture). 
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and constructive friction.35  These interactions allow for the 
direct flow of ideas from the university to business and vice 
versa across a wide range of disciplines and the full panoply of 
basic to applied research.36  As Laszlo Barbási’s research at the 
University of Notre Dame suggests, this flow of ideas within 
and across networks and along their nodes frequently forms the 
genesis of new opportunities and perspectives, particularly 
when such flow is across nodes and networks that might lack 
familiarity with each other.37  Andrew Hargadon at the 
University of California-Davis points out that ideas bridging 
worlds promote innovation.38 
Moreover, university-business relationships can enhance 
the university’s reputation, thereby allowing it to recruit higher 
quality faculty, who attract more research funding that yields 
advances in research and results, which perpetuates a cycle—
all to the benefit of faculty, students, and the university.39 
                                                          
 35. ANNA S. NILSSON ET AL., COMMERCIALIZATION OF LIFE-SCIENCE 
RESEARCH AT UNIVERSITIES IN THE UNITED STATES, JAPAN AND CHINA 17 
(2006), available at 
http://www.itps.se/Archive/Documents/Swedish/Publikationer/Rapporter/Allm
%E4nna/A2006/A2006_006%20webb.pdf ; Siegel, supra note 30, at 126; see 
also Andrew Nelson & Thomas Byers, Organizational Modularity and Intra-
University Relationships Between Entrepreneurship Education and Technology 
Transfer, in UNIVERSITY ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: 
PROCESS, DESIGN, AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 275 (Gary Libecap ed., 2005) 
(describing that networks between entrepreneurship education and the 
engineering schools are critical and foster technology transfer and 
entrepreneurship); Donald S. Siegel & Phillip H. Phan, Analyzing the 
Effectiveness of University Technology Transfer: Implications for 
Entrepreneurship Education, in UNIVERSITY ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND 
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: PROCESS, DESIGN, AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 28 
(Gary Libecap ed., 2005) (noting that ties between star scientists and firm 
scientists have a positive effect on technology transfer). 
 36. Siegel, supra note 30, at 130. 
 37. ALBERT- LÁSZLÓ BARBÁSI, LINKED: HOW EVERYTHING IS CONNECTED 
TO EVERYTHING ELSE AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR BUSINESS, SCIENCE, AND 
EVERYDAY LIFE 43, 61, 212 (2003); see also NILSSON ET AL., supra note 35 
(finding that interaction between research and market actors helps to develop 
discovery); Markman et al., supra note 11, at 255 (“[T]he frequent engagement 
with the university’s scientists to advance the technology can lead to 
substantial knowledge spillover effects.”). 
 38. Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation, Understanding the Innovation 
Process: The Power of Social Networks, An Interview with Andrew Hargadon, 
in KAUFFMAN THOUGHTBOOK 2005, 122 (2005); Audretsch et al., supra note 
27, at 84 (explaining the importance of social capital and social networks in 
generating economic growth). 
 39. See Libecap, supra note 34, at ix; see also PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL 2008, 
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However, there are those who contend that the university’s 
reputation and scientific integrity suffer because of ethical 
problems associated with university efforts to advance 
innovations.40 
C. ETHICAL OPPOSITION TO ADVANCING INNOVATION 
Those who oppose advancing university innovation contend 
that university collaboration with industry compromises 
academic freedom and research integrity, which creates a 
downward spiral of destruction instead of a virtuous cycle of 
advancement.41  It is important to understand these divergent 
views to counter them when suspect and address them when 
valid.  Additionally, since a federal policy that extols utilization 
of research results implicitly requires the results and processes 
by which they were achieved be and appear to be credible and 
reliable,42 it is incumbent on university leaders and their 
advisors to ensure that their advancing innovation programs 
competently address legitimate ethical concerns. 
1. Conflicts of Interest and Other Ethical Problems 
Even before the Bayh-Dole Act, universities worked with 
industry in numerous ways.  Among these are seemingly 
innocuous charitable contributions (which can sometimes seem 
harmful) as part of ordinary fundraising efforts.43  Other 
examples include sponsored-research initiatives, engagements 
with university researchers as consultants or advisors, and 
arrangements where researchers and the university share 
royalties, license fees, and equity ownership with industry.  
Some worry that these latter types of interactions give rise to 
inherent and nearly universal conflicts of interest and 
                                                          
supra note 12, at 34 (university-industry relationships increase “mutual 
understanding of organizational missions, abilities, and constraints, and 
generally builds trust between partners, a prerequisite for formalized 
partnerships”). 
 40. See infra notes 35–45. 
 41. See infra notes 35–45; see also PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL 2008, supra note 
12, at 69 (recognizing that some academics believe that funding from industry 
negatively affects research and that universities must work to change those 
perceptions). 
 42. See supra note 2. 
 43. Richard E. Just & Wallace E. Huffman, The Role of Patents, Royalties, 
and Public-Private Partnering in University Funding, in  ESSAYS IN HONOR OF 
STANLEY R. JOHNSON, Article 7, 2 (2006), available at 
http://www.bepress.com/sjohnson/art7. 
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commitments that are inappropriate and cannot effectively be 
reconciled.44 
Such opponents argue that through such interaction, the 
reliability of substantive research suffers because business can 
or can be perceived to bias the choice and design of research 
questions, how research is assigned to students,45 and criteria 
or characteristics of those to be tested.46  Critics argue that 
university-industry interactions compromise objectivity and 
that industry will try to unduly influence research topics, 
methods, results, and even the substantive reports 
themselves.47  These concerns are legitimate, and this influence 
can exist (or be perceived to exist) even if those involved are of 
impeccable, ethical character.48 
Opponents also contend that ethical conflicts threaten 
academia itself by distracting from teaching and basic 
research,49 undermining collegiality,50 encouraging secrecy,51 
                                                          
 44. See BOK, supra note 31 at 66–67; Harrington, supra note 31, at 787; 
SCHACHT, 32076, supra note 2, at 18–23; see also Dick Thornburgh, Building 
and Retaining Trust in the Biomedical Community, 74 CLEV. CLINIC J. MED. 
(SUPP.) S38, S39 (2007). 
 45. Harrington, supra note 31. 
 46. Id. at 776, 779; SCHACHT, 32076, supra note 2, at 19–20 (citations 
omitted). 
 47. See Harrington, supra note 31, at 776, 788; BOK, supra note 31, at 71–
76; SCHACHT, 32076, supra note 2, at 19; see also Thornburgh, supra note 44, 
at S40 (“[B]usiness considerations may inappropriately influence medical care, 
purchasing decisions, and clinical research findings.”); JENNIFER WASHBURN, 
UNIVERSITY INC.: THE CORPORATE CORRUPTION OF HIGHER EDUCATION 75 
(2005) (“[C]orporate sponsors may be manipulating manuscripts or 
suppressing unwelcome research to serve their commercial interests.”); 
WASHBURN, supra, at 81 (“Far more common are instances where corporations 
exert influence over academic research that is more subtle—and hence more 
difficult to detect.”); WASHBURN, supra, at 84 (such as pre-selecting favorable 
scholars); WASHBURN, supra, at 110 (control over trial design); WASHBURN, 
supra, at 112 (publish favorable points and bury less favorable); WASHBURN, 
supra, at 113 (suppressing negative studies). 
 48. BOK, supra note 31, at 67; see also WASHBURN, supra note 47, at 111 
(using high profile academic “guest writers” can lead to imputed credibility 
“when this is nothing more than an illusion”). 
 49. Harrington, supra note 31, at 780; BOK, supra note 31, at 64, 111; 
WASHBURN, supra note 47, at 32; SCHACHT, 32076, supra note 2, at 20. But see 
BOK, supra note 31, at 142 (“Two decades of experience reveals no significant 
tendency to abandon basic research for more profitable kinds of applied or 
practical work. Nor could anyone observing the growing numbers of learned 
journals and scholarly books make a convincing case that serious scholarship 
has suffered . . . . [T]he urge for discovery and the desire for respect from 
worthy colleagues have been more than a match for the lure of making 
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preventing or delaying publication,52 and devaluing humanities 
and social sciences.53  Ironically, some universities have at 
times demanded publication restrictions, transfer prohibitions, 
and rights to future discoveries even though they might invoke 
their own academic and research mission to object when others 
seek to apply these restrictions to them.54 
Unfortunately, compromised integrity in academia is not 
new nor is it limited to relationships involving industry.55  Such 
problems existed before the Bayh-Dole Act passed in 1980, and 
                                                          
money.”); Katherine J. Strandburg, Curiosity-Driven Research and University 
Technology Transfer, in UNIVERSITY ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND TECHNOLOGY 
TRANSFER: PROCESS, DESIGN, AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 94 (Gary Libecap 
ed., 2005) (citing that the evidence is mixed on whether increased patenting 
caused scientists to shifted toward more applied research). 
 50. BOK, supra note 31, at 113; Siegel, supra note 30, at 129; CREST 
REPORT at 27. 
 51. See Siegel, supra note 30, at 127; Harrington, supra note 31, at 788; 
BOK, supra note 31, at 64, 203–04; MOWERY ET AL., supra  note 19, at 1,185 
(citations omitted); SCHACHT, 32076, supra note 2, at 14; WASHBURN, supra 
note 47, at 75; Margo A. Bagley, Academic Discourse and Proprietary Rights: 
Putting Patents in their Proper Place, 47 B.C. L. REV. 217, 221, 251, 253, 263 
(2006). But see Strandburg, supra note 49, at 94 (stating that it is unclear 
whether increase in university patenting resulting from the Bayh-Dole Act is 
connected to increasing delays and secrecy). 
 52. WASHBURN, supra note 47, at 75; Bagley, supra note 51, at 240. 
 53. WASHBURN, supra note 47, at 23–24, 33 (quoting Robert Berdahl from 
the University of California Berkeley about “a corresponding devaluation of 
the work of humanists and social scientists”). 
 54. Ritchie de Larena, supra note 10, at 1420 (citing and quoting from a 
study by the National Institutes of Health). 
 55. BOK, supra note 31, at 114; WASHBURN, supra note 47, at 33 (“Many 
of the fundamental tensions that continue to pervade higher education 
today⎯. . . the struggle between preserving autonomy and serving outside 
interests⎯first surfaced in the nineteenth century.”). Researchers have been 
known to fabricate data and manipulate analyses and results solely in the 
name of tenure, publication, or reputation, without any reason to consider 
money or business relationships. Relying on human frailty to argue that 
universities should not engage with industry is tantamount to arguing that 
human nature cannot be controlled, moderated, or trusted. Pursuing such an 
argument to its logical conclusion would justify eliminating research 
conducted by humans who work at universities. Rather than eliminate 
university-industry relationships, the more reasonable course is to 
acknowledge both the potential and weakness inherent in the human 
condition and then institute policies and practices to effectively manage those 
relationships to minimize the potential for lapses. See James G. Sheehan, 
Fraud, Conflict of Interest, and Other Enforcement Issues in Clinical Research, 
74 CLEV. CLINIC J. OF MED. (SUPP.) S63-S66 (2007) (arguing that fraud in 
scientific research is a widespread problem, with examples including Sigmund 
Freud, Isaac Newton, Louis Pasteur, and Gregor Mendel); see also Siepmann, 
supra note 1, at 242 (noting that financial conflicts of interest have been in 
place since government started funding research in 1950). 
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they existed before universities increased their involvement 
with industry56 Therefore, it is disingenuous to blame Bayh-
Dole or increased innovation for the ethical problems that exist 
in academia.  Furthermore, it is fallacious to suggest that if 
universities barred or abandoned their efforts these ethical 
problems would end.  Regardless, opponents are correct that 
ethical lapses can threaten safety, health, and the welfare of 
individuals,57 and ultimately impact industry and its bottom 
line.58 
Industry has a vested interest in preserving academic and 
research integrity or it risks losing money invested in 
developing products based on faulty research, their profit 
potential, and opportunities lost because of the wasted time 
and focus.59  Such problems also can affect the quality of the 
workforce and can devastate companies and their employees, 
creditors, investors, and even communities.  In addition, ethical 
lapses can undermine reliability of research results that are or 
are perceived to be compromised. 
There is validity to the concerns raised by opponents and 
critics of university–industry relationships, but neither the 
problems nor the solutions should be overblown. Fortunately, 
opponents of such relationships are not the only ones concerned 
about the negative (and even potentially destructive) impact of 
un-reconciled ethical problems.  Among the differences, 
however, is that purist opponents appear prepared to forgo the 
economic growth, advances in human welfare, and other 
benefits of university–industry relationships while others 
recognize that these benefits are valuable enough to justify 
reconciling these problems appropriately.60  Congress appears 
                                                          
 56. See infra notes 80–81 
 57. Harrington, supra note 31, at 776; MOWERY ET AL., supra note 19, at 
191. 
 58. See Harrington, supra note 31, at 797–98. 
 59. See generally WASHBURN, supra note 47, at 190–97 (quoting industry 
representatives who complain about universities focusing on “profit-
maximizing” behavior and neglect their roles as educators, innovators, and 
experimenters). 
 60. See Harrington, supra note 31, at 783 (noting attempts at regulation 
instead of elimination of university faculty conflicts of interest); BOK, supra 
note 31, at 203–04 (urging universities to be “more vigilant in guarding their 
basic academic values”); SCHACHT, 32076, supra note 2, at 19 (quoting 
Katherine Ku from Stanford University’s Office of Technology Licensing about 
the need to evaluate the criticisms of the Bayh-Dole Act); see also Zachary, 
supra note 20 (explaining that risk of interference from industry and limits on 
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to be among the latter.61 
2. Managing Ethical Problems, Respecting Academic Freedom, 
and Advancing Innovation 
In passing the Bayh-Dole Act, Congress intended for 
universities to engage with industry.62  Congress must have 
understood the possibility that such interaction could give rise 
to conflicts of interest and other ethical problems.  Yet, 
Congress set federal policy as it did, from which we may 
extrapolate that Congress expected the individual universities 
to manage those problems, not to avoid or to over-react to them. 
It does not follow that federal policy would tolerate the 
systematic prohibition of interaction with business or other 
draconian measures.  Instead, it does follow that Congress 
expects the university—particularly its leadership and 
advisors—to balance the benefits to be gained from engagement 
against the difficulties of conflicts of interest and other ethical 
quandaries.63 
Of course, given human nature and the dangers of 
financial corruption, nothing is foolproof, but a properly aligned 
pecuniary interest can motivate disciplined compliance with 
academic integrity and ethical norms.  Policies and procedures 
appropriate to the university’s circumstances can minimize the 
ethical risks and promote potential gains by ensuring that 
those involved from the university and business are clear on 
expectations.  Clear expectations can guide those with good will 
and judgment to pursue the legitimate benefits of university-
                                                          
academic freedom seem “small”); see also PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL 2008, supra 
note 12, at 69 (recommending that universities address the view among some 
academics that funding from industry negatively affects research). 
 61. See infra note 62 and accompanying text. 
 62. See 35 U.S.C. § 200 (“It is the policy and objective of the Congress . . . 
to promote collaboration between commercial concerns and nonprofit 
organizations, including universities.”); see also supra note 2. 
 63. Harrington, supra note 31, at 808 (quoting University of California 
conflict of interest disclosure policy: whether “potential public benefits to be 
gained outweigh any potential erosion of academic freedom, collegiality, or 
public trust”; and quoting University of Miami conflict of interest disclosure 
policy, “the potential negative impacts that may arise from a significant 
financial interest are outweighed by interests of scientific progress, technology 
transfer, or the public health and welfare, then the University may allow the 
project to go forward without imposing such conditions or restrictions”); see 
also Edward D. Miller, Creating an Institutional Conflict-of-Interest Policy at 
Johns Hopkins: Progress and Lessons Learned, 74 CLEV. CLINIC J. MED. 
(SUPP.) S70 (2007) (arguing that academic medical centers should focus on 
managing conflict of interest risks). 
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industry relationships.  Jennifer Washburn, journalist, author, 
and fellow at the New America Foundation, attempts this 
ethical balancing act by proposing that universities prohibit 
anyone in key research positions from having personal 
financial ties or equity interests in any enterprise that might 
benefit from the research.64  She also recommends that grant 
recipients be barred from holding executive positions with or 
serving in advisory capacities to companies that might benefit 
from the research both when the research is undertaken and 
for one or two years thereafter.65 
While these suggestions perpetuate strong ethical 
standards, they seem to overstate the bad in people.  Although 
potentially appropriate in unique situations at a given 
university whose reputation has been denigrated, broad 
adoption of Washburn’s or similar suggestions could discourage 
pursuit of critical research, inhibit innovation, and deny access 
to fundamental knowledge and experience.  Among the 
problems with Washburn’s suggestions is the prospect that just 
about anyone could benefit financially from the researcher’s 
work except the people with the best knowledge of the research, 
its applications, and who also took the greatest professional 
risks. 
In his review of Washburn’s book, J. Steven Rutt, Ph.D., a 
practicing attorney and author, characterizes her concerns as 
“partially valid but reflect[ing] a narrow, if not distorted, 
idealism about big university life, bordering on naiveté.”66 He 
continues that a “university divorced from commerce can easily 
become a microcosm of its own, driven by egos, elitism, petty 
rivalry, and hunger for grant money.”67 Rutt dismisses 
Washburn’s suggestion for the pursuit of “[a] purely academic 
focus, divorced from common sense, ethical thinking, public 
service, the real world, and traditional ideals of academia [that] 
is not a desirable alternative to the status quo.”68 
Stated another way, Washburn’s recommendations do not 
effectively balance the relevant competing interests enough to 
                                                          
 64. WASHBURN, supra note 47, at 235 
 65. Id. 
 66. J. Steven Rutt, Bayh-Dole and Nanotechnology: A Review of 
University Inc.: The Corporate Corruption of Higher Education, 2 NANOTECH 
L. & BUS. 405, 407 (2005) (book review). 
 67. Id. at 409. 
 68. Id. 
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justify its universal adoption or even consideration.  Certain 
institutions may find her recommendations necessary, 
particularly if they need to rebuild lost or tarnished trust. 
Integrity and credibility can be appropriately protected, 
however, without implementing such extreme steps and 
incurring the accompanying lost opportunities and potential 
unfairness. 
The primary strategies for solving the problems Washburn 
and others present are various degrees of transparency to 
funders, administrations, publishers, and the public regarding 
following: 
a. grants, sponsorships, and other sources of funding 
toward related research, equipment, personnel, etc.; 
b. the identities of collaborators and even those who 
shaped research questions, protocol, and methodology; and 
c. sources, types and amounts of consulting, advising, and 
investing revenue and extent of time spent away from academic 
responsibilities in pursuit of such revenue. 
Other complementary strategies that universities have 
adopted include increased oversight over research and its 
protocols, replication of research results by uninvolved neutral 
researchers, leaves-of-absence for the researcher, diversified 
sources of funding to protect against dependency and the 
corresponding leverage (real or perceived), limiting delays in 
publication to minimally necessary time requirements, setting 
reasonable limits on compensation researchers may receive in 
conflicted circumstances,69 and establishing panels or other 
informed resources to provide perspectives on specific 
situations.  The degree to which universities incorporate these 
and other strategies may depend on the degree of the 
university’s involvement with industry and the sophistication 
of the university’s leadership, advisors, and researchers. 
In addition, effective university conflicts-of-interest and 
ethics programs should require education for researchers and 
funders and impose consequences for violators.  Education and 
training can ensure both awareness of the procedures and 
                                                          
 69. For instance, the Mayo Clinic does not accept royalty payments and 
does not permit its researchers to accept such payments on commercial tests 
any Mayo physician may order. Interview with Michael J. Ackerman, M.D., 
Ph.D., Director of the Long QT Syndrome Clinic at the Mayo Clinic, in 
Rochester, MN (Aug. 12, 2008). Mayo has adopted this approach to ensure 
that patients can be confident that such tests are not motivated by pecuniary 
interests.  Id. 
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understanding about why they exist, which can enhance 
compliance. 
Some might find it unnecessary to implement 
consequential punishment in their conflicts-of-interest 
programs, because of the threat that a researcher’s reputation 
and the credibility of his or her research may suffer, that he or 
she may have difficulty obtaining or keeping tenure, a job, or 
grant funding, or that he or she may be liable for civil or 
criminal remedies.  The university must be able to protect itself 
and preserve its reputation, however, and the ability to mete 
out consequences can help. 
When a researcher(s) or others conclude that the benefits 
of unethical behavior outweigh the likelihood of getting caught 
or attendant harm, appropriately promulgated and imposed 
consequences can motivate compliance and deter others from 
non-compliance.70 In addition, having the ability to impose 
consequences may be critical for the university and its 
leadership to minimize damage to institutional trust and 
integrity.  Consequences are likely to differ between tenured 
and non-tenured faculty but should refer to a spectrum that 
includes demotion, reassignment, disgorgement, suspension, 
and even termination. 
Ironically, academia itself—whose members are among the 
most vociferous opponents of university engagement with 
industry—can impose serious consequences for severe ethical 
lapses, but is reluctant to do so.71  Their opposition, in the 
                                                          
 70. For example, when former Treasury Secretary Paul O’Neill became 
CEO of Alcoa he identified worker safety as a key priority. Early in his tenure, 
he terminated a highly ranked employee, who many viewed as a superstar, 
because he failed to report an injury within 24 hours of its occurrence as 
required by safety rules.  Alcoa’s accident rate went down to virtually zero. See 
Susan H. Ehringhaus et al., Guidelines and Performance: Creating a Culture 
of Ethics, Panel Discussion, 74 CLEV. CLINIC J. OF MED. (SUPP.) S77, S77–S78 
(2007). 
 71. See John G. Bruhn et al., Moral Positions and Academic Conduct: 
Parameters of Tolerance for Ethics Failure, 73 J. HIGHER EDUC. 461,476–77 
(2002) (citing others that faculty accuse administrators of intrusion on 
academic freedom when administrators even attempt to gather information 
about misconduct); THE GALLUP ORG. FOR THE OFFICE OF RESEARCH 
INTEGRITY, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., FINAL REPORT: 
OBSERVING AND REPORTING SUSPECTED MISCONDUCT IN BIOMEDICAL 
RESEARCH 14–16, 40 (2006) (revised April 2008) (referencing a survey of 2,212 
National Institutes of Health researchers found that 164 scientists reported 
201 incidents of misconduct such as falsification, fabrication, or plagiarism; 
estimating also that thirty-six percent of suspected misconduct incidents not 
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name of academic freedom, can undermine deterrence and 
protect unethical actors and behaviors. Yet, such people are 
prepared to compromise academic freedom by preventing 
constructive engagement with industry and placing other limits 
on informed judgment and decision-making.  Such opposition 
suggests an irreconcilable paradox in which academic freedom 
seems more important than appropriately punishing unethical 
behavior but not as important as efforts to manage the 
circumstances that might give rise to unethical behavior in the 
first place. 
Valiantly pursuing appropriate ethical standards and 
institutional integrity is worthwhile for its own sake, but there 
is another important benefit to a balanced program.  Managing 
these matters properly can teach several lessons to those 
involved with and those who observe the program—particularly 
students and faculty—who will take their experiences into 
business and public service.  Their engagement provides 
invaluable training in the importance of ethical behavior and 
facing, rather than avoiding, these difficult problems.  It 
teaches that such dilemmas are not merely theoretical 
classroom exercises but have “real world” implications. And, if 
pursued appropriately, the struggle for balanced ethics can 
teach tangible, constructive approaches to resolving these 
sometimes perplexing problems, not just in academia but in 
business and public service. 
Business and society need universities to find the right 
balance between militant, inefficient processes at one extreme, 
and narcissistic self-indulgence at the other.72  In doing so, 
universities need to ensure that the policies and practices used 
                                                          
reported to institutional officials); Scott Jaschik, Truth and Consequences, 
May 17, 2006, http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2006/05/17/churchill 
(explaining an investigation by the University of Colorado of alleged 
misconduct by Ward Churchill which came only after controversial comments 
about the victims of the September 11, 2001 attacks, despite long standing 
“knowledge” among scholars of alleged plagiarism, falsification, and 
fabrication; detailing further that two panel members opposed Churchill’s 
termination to protect academic freedom); Jonathon Knight & Carol J. Auster, 
Faculty Conduct: An Empirical Study of Ethical Activism, 70 J. HIGHER EDUC. 
188, 203 (1999) (explaining that administrators took no action in about sixty-
one percent of complaints of misconduct such as plagiarism and sexual 
harassment). 
 72. See, e.g., Harrington, supra note 31, at 808 (citing University of 
California conflict of interest policy); see also Thornburgh, supra note 44, at 
S38 (encourages focus on facilitating effective disclosure of potential conflicts 
and ensuring their transparent and consistent management). 
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to promote ethical behavior and remediate violations are not 
worse than the problems being remedied and that the perfect 
does not become the enemy of the good.73  Moreover, industry 
needs to avoid short-sightedness through which it can be its 
own worst enemy by tempting the reliability and integrity of 
university innovation and research.  It is worth struggling to 
get the balance right and keep it right, even as circumstances 
change.  After all, undertaking this challenge is implicitly 
corollary to our nation’s policies regarding advancing university 
innovation.74 
III. BAYH-DOLE ACT OF 1980 
There is controversy about the effectiveness of Bayh-Dole 
and its impact on university advancing innovation.75  Some of 
the controversy revolves around principles of “causation” 
(whether Bayh-Dole caused an increase in patenting, licensing, 
and other outputs) as distinguished from the Act’s 
“effectiveness” (the extent to which Bayh-Dole was one of many 
factors that may have promoted an already burgeoning 
university interest in advancing innovation).76 
Bayh-Dole apologists are correct that the Act achieved its 
                                                          
 73. Wikiquote, http://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Voltaire (last visited Oct. 16, 
2008) (quoting VOLTAIRE, Dramatic Art, in QUESTIONS SUR L’ENCYCLOPÉDIE 
(1764) (literally translated as “The best is the enemy of good”). 
 74. See supra note 2. 
 75. See Richard R. Nelson, Observations on the Post-Bayh-Dole Rise of 
Patenting at American Universities, 26 J. TECH. TRANSFER 13, 13–14 (2001) 
(citing the widespread impression that increases in university technology 
transfer attributable to the Bayh-Dole Act but explanation more complex); 
Scott Shane, Encouraging University Entrepreneurship? The Effect of the 
Bayh-Dole Act on University Patenting in the United States, 19 J. BUS. 
VENTURING 127, 128 (2004); see also MOWERY ET AL., supra note 19, at 7; 
David C. Mowery, The Bayh-Dole Act and High Technology Entrepreneurship 
in U.S. Universities: Chicken, Egg, or Something Else?, in UNIVERSITY 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: PROCESS, DESIGN, AND 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 39, 41 (Gary Libecap ed., 2005) (noting that the 
emphasis on Bayh-Dole as prompting university and industry collaboration 
ignores history stretching back to early twentieth century); Strandburg, supra 
note 49, at 94 (“clear evidence . . . that patenting at universities has increased 
drastically over the past 30 years, but less clear evidence linking the increased 
patenting to the Bayh-Dole Act itself”); Strandburg, supra note 49, at 103 
(referring to Professors Eisengerg and Rai’s extensive work on the potential 
adverse effects of Bayh-Dole); Boettiger & Bennett, supra note 10, at 262; 
Boettiger & Bennett, supra note 16, at 320. 
 76. See, e.g., Boettiger & Bennett, supra note 16, at 320. 
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primary objective.  It has helped smooth the commercialization 
process by imposing consistency among federal agencies in the 
United States about how they treat intellectual property 
generated from federally funded research.77  Some point to the 
Act and claim success or even victory based on statistics about 
the growth in the number of technology transfer offices at 
universities,78 the increasing numbers of licenses and other 
university transactions, increased revenue from those 
transactions, and even more start-up companies emerging from 
university innovations.79 
Unfortunately, many of the technology transfer offices that 
began to proliferate after Bayh-Dole seem to have emerged 
without adequate consideration about how the offices fit within 
and in service to the academic mission, the numerous 
intellectual property strategies available in addition to 
patenting and licensing, the financial and personnel resources 
necessary to operate such offices most effectively, and the Act’s 
other purposes.  Instead, many university leaders and their 
advisers, including many from the legal profession, seem to 
have focused technology transfer offices and university policies 
and behaviors on commercializing research outcomes with 
particular emphasis on generating revenue through patenting 
and licensing,80 with a further focus on pursuing the rare 
                                                          
 77. Boettiger & Bennett, supra note 1010, at 278; Ritchie de Larena, 
supra note 10, at 1437. 
 78. The Association of University Technology Managers reports that 
twenty-seven universities had technology transfer offices and programs before 
1983. Between 1983 and 1999, approximately one hundred and twenty 
universities started programs, and about fifteen more were added between 
2000 and 2006. During the same time parameters, hospitals and research 
institutions added six (pre-1983), between nineteen and twenty-five (1983-
1999), and five technology transfer offices (2000–2006), respectively. AUTM, 
U.S. LICENSING SURVEY, FY 2005 SURVEY SUMMARY 16–17 (Dana Bostrom & 
Robert Tieckelmann eds., 2007), available at 
http://www.autm.net/events/File/US_LS_05Final(1).pdf [hereinafter AUTM 
2005]; AUTM, U.S. LICENSING SURVEY, FY 2006 SURVEY SUMMARY 14–15 
(Dana Bostrom & Robert Tieckelmann eds., 2007), available at 
http://www.autm.net/events/file/AUTM_06_US%20LSS_FNL.pdf [hereinafter 
AUTM 2006]. 
 79. Chester G. Moore, Killing the Bayh-Dole Act’s Golden Goose, 8 TUL. J. 
TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 151, 155–56 (2006); Gary Pulsinelli, Share and Share 
Alike: Increasing Access to Government-Funded Inventions Under the Bayh-
Dole Act, 7 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 393, 410 (2006). 
 80. Markman et al., supra note 11, at 250–51, 253–54, 257; Boettiger & 
Bennett, supra note 10, at 273–74 (noting that university focus on goal of 
income has in part shaped function of technology transfer system); Boettiger & 
Bennett, supra note 10, at 280 (suggesting that having income as a primary 
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financial home run.81 
If university leaders are going to limit the charge of 
technology transfer offices to patenting and licensing or 
research outcomes with revenue potential, the university 
should have other means by which they are implementing the 
balance of Bayh-Dole’s mandates.  Restricting innovation 
efforts in this way facilitates being overly focused on patenting 
and revenue to the detriment of other, potentially more useful 
strategies and lost opportunities for other non- or low revenue 
innovations.  Although commercialization should not be 
abandoned or ignored, it is only part of one of the seven 
purposes Congress expressed in the Act.82 
At some institutions, inadequate consideration has also 
been given to the increasing complexity of relationships, 
opportunities, and strategies associated with advancing 
innovations.83  As a result, many technology transfer offices are 
under-staffed, under-resourced, and under-supported.84 
These circumstances further impact how technology 
transfer offices fulfill responsibilities that relate to intellectual 
property rights, valuation, risk assessments, licensing 
strategies, and otherwise.  They also can affect how researchers 
view advancing innovation and how they relate to those 
                                                          
goal led universities to “develop isolated programs and . . . overprotect 
inventions with unproven commercial value”); Ritchie de Larena, supra note 
10, at 1381; see also PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL 2008, supra note 12, at 21 
(referencing the “misalignment of incentive systems” and encouraging that 
universities more appropriately link outputs to incentives); PRESIDENT’S 
COUNCIL 2008, supra note 12, at 35 (technology transfer personnel should be 
assessed on their value added or volume of products or knowledge moved 
instead of revenue generated and Federal agencies and universities should 
provide incentives for “industry participation, entrepreneurship activities and 
fostering State and local involvement”). 
 81. Ritchie de Larena, supra note 10, at 1381–82 (constant lottery effect); 
see also PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL 2008, supra note 12, at 28 (encouraging 
universities to approach advancing innovation with a “volume model” rather 
than a “home run” or income model). 
 82. See Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 § 200, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 
(codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200, 202(a), 202(c)(1), 202(c)(7)(B) (2000)) 
(explaining that among the purposes of the Bayh-Dole Act are “to promote the 
commercialization and public availability”); see also supra note 7 for the Act’s 
purposes quoted in their entirety. 
 83. Bagley, supra note 51 at, 262–63; Ritchie de Larena, supra note 10, at 
1412 (citations omitted); see Markman et al., supra note 11, at 261 (noting 
disparities in sophistication and success of the 128 technology transfer offices 
in the study). 
 84. WASHBURN, supra note 47, at 230. 
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responsible for helping them do so. Finally, researchers can 
infer from these indicators whether university leaders view 
cooperation with advancing innovation efforts as important. 
Congress intended Bayh-Dole to facilitate the usefulness of 
federally funded university research and innovation, and it 
stated a desire that university leaders implement it with a 
hunger for more than just revenue. Instead, university 
technology transfer office mission statements overwhelmingly 
emphasize licensing for royalties and intellectual property 
protection and management.85 Frequently lacking has been an 
emphasis on (and sometimes even recognition of) Bayh-Dole’s 
corollary goals of promoting the “utilization of inventions 
arising from federally supported research and development” 
and “the public availability of inventions made in the United 
States,” which seems to encourage an emphasis on “deal flow 
density rather than volume.”86 
Taking their lead from mission statements and in an era of 
management theories such as total quality management, 
dashboards, benchmarking, six sigma, and other purported 
success measures of the 1980s and 1990s, many universities 
began using linear standards of measure to demonstrate their 
compliance with federal policy under Bayh-Dole and their 
federal grants.87  Those measures predictably have resulted in 
counting: disclosures, patent applications, patents, start-ups, 
                                                          
 85. Markman et al., supra note 11, at 253–54. In a sample of 128 
university technology transfer office mission statements, the authors found 
that they mentioned licensing for royalties 78.72% of the time and intellectual 
property protection and management 75.18% of the time. These mission 
statements mentioned the public good 54.61% of the time to finish in fifth 
place. Id. 
 86. Bayh-Dole Act, 35 U.S.C. § 200; see Crow, supra note 13, at 24 
(explaining Arizona State University’s strategic objectives for advancing 
innovation and expounding further that “in other words, to maximize the 
number of investions and discoveries actually moved into use, instead of trying 
to maximize near-term income from fewer and bigger deals”); WASHBURN, 
supra note 47, at 146 (“[Universities] have no duty to return value to 
shareholders, and their principal obligation under the Bayh-Dole Act is to 
promote utilization, not to maximize financial returns. . .”) (quoting National 
Institutes of Health 1998 working group report) (alteration in original); 
Ritchie de Larena, supra note 10, at 1377 (objectives of Bayh-Dole have not 
been fully achieved); Ritchie de Larena, supra note 10, at 1385 (objectives of 
Act to promote technology transfer through licensing, not to enrich 
universities) (quotation omitted). 
 87. See, e.g., Schacht, 33528, supra note 2, at 3 (noting that increased 
federal funds for basic research were expected to yield “concomitant” increases 
in new products and processes but “this linear concept is no longer considered 
valid”). 
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and of course royalties and other revenues.88  While these 
standards serve certain purposes, they do not fully measure 
results or effectiveness against the broader purposes of Bayh-
Dole.89  Unfortunately, this approach to measurement 
contributed to university personnel focusing too intently on the 
patent-license model, which narrowed the entire vision for 
university innovation.90 
To some degree, how universities have operated under 
Bayh-Dole might be analogized to people who tend to look at 
advancing innovation through a particular window in a room 
with a full circle, panoramic view of forests, meadows, beaches, 
and mountains, depending on the window.  Even if the view 
through any particular window is good, it is not the only 
window in the room.  There are other views––other windows—
that contribute to the overall view from the room with the other 
windows enhancing appreciation of the beauty.  Failing or 
refusing to take advantage of the views offered from other 
windows denies potential by denying information and 
alternatives; it also can lead to a distorted reality reminiscent 
of Plato’s Allegory of the Cave.91 
The biggest problems with Bayh-Dole have nothing to do 
with the underlying Act itself.  Instead, the problems seem to 
                                                          
 88. See Siegel Study, supra note 29, at 33–34; see also PRESIDENT’S 
COUNCIL 2008, supra note 12, at 23. 
 89. See Siegel Study, supra note 29, at 33 (“There are several difficulties 
with the output data.”); Robert E. Litan et al., Commercializing University 
Innovations: A Better Way 3–4 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working 
Paper No. O18, M13, 033, 034, 038, 2007), available at 
http://www.kauffman.org/pdf/NBER_0407.pdf (“while many of the university 
TTOs met their narrow mandate by channeling university-generated 
inventions into generating revenue for the university, the broader and more 
fundamental goal of the original Bayh-Dole Act remains elusive—to maximize 
the potential for university-based inventions to result in commercialized new 
products and innovations.”). 
 90. Id. at 8–9 (“Measuring university success in spawning innovation 
solely by licensing or patenting activities, therefore, almost certainly masks 
the importance of these other means of knowledge diffusion.”); Siegel Study, 
supra note 29, at 34, tbl.6 (“Other respondents noted that TTOs are . . . too 
concerned with the legal aspects of licensing.”). 
 91. VII PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 514a-17a (Allan Bloom trans., Basic Books, 
1968). For an academic discussion of a few of the alternative and 
complementary approaches to advancing university innovation, see Litan et 
al., supra note 89, at 11–16 (among the strategies discussed are patenting, 
multiple volume approaches, faculty free agency, regional alliances, internet-
based approaches, and faculty loyalty); see also Boettiger & Bennett, supra 
note 10, at 279 & n.71 (patent-licensing channel is one of many avenues). 
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arise from the perceptions that existed, and in some 
institutions still exist, that revenue is the objective and 
measuring revenue-related activities in the name of complying 
with Bayh-Dole is the same as or better than measuring 
impact, outcomes, and results.  Also contributing to problems 
may be perceptions that doing something is good enough, when 
the true objective is doing more or better.  Unfortunately, many 
have sought to pursue the Act’s purposes as technical functions 
rather than as a component of an overall entrepreneurial 
culture.92 
Another problem facing those engaged in advancing 
university innovations is that, contrary to some perceptions, 
Bayh-Dole did not solve (and was not intended to solve) many 
of the problems that researchers, administrators, and industry 
have been complaining about since long before Bayh-Dole 
passed in 1980.93  Nearly three decades later, the following 
problems remain and, in some cases, have become even greater 
impediments to the effective and efficient exploitation of 
university innovations: 
the high cost of patent management; 
the “infrequent and unpredictable” occurrence of the “home 
run” innovation; 
the need for close relationships with faculty; 
the impact on academic freedom, research integrity, and 
conflicts of interest; 
maintaining strong, appropriate relationships with the 
community; 
problems associated with balancing revenues with other 
university expectations for its research and technology transfer 
endeavors; and 
the expense in time and money, stress, and anxiety 
associated with negotiating licenses, assignments, use rights, 
royalties, license fees, indemnification, representations, 
                                                          
 92. Coffman et al., supra note 2, at 3; cf. Megan Ristau Baca, Note, 
Barriers to Innovation: Intellectual Property Transaction Costs in Scientific 
Collaboration, 2006 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 4, 14 (2006), 
http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/articles/pdf/2006dltr0004.pdf (“[the 
Bayh-Dole Act] provides a somewhat perverse incentive to privatize at a very 
early stage of research . . . .”). 
 93. WASHBURN,  supra note 47, at 33 (“Many of the fundamental tensions 
that continue to pervade higher education today . . . first surfaced in the 
nineteenth century.”); Ritchie de Larena, supra note 10, at 1403 (“Problems 
with university management of federal funds predate passage of the Bayh-
Dole Act.”). 
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warranties, covenants and other terms.94 
To some degree these barriers originate from the persistent 
complaint that the numerous participants do not know or 
understand each other’s work environments, procedures, 
terminologies, rewards, constraints, etc.95  However, and at the 
risk of giving industry a free pass, the barriers also may reflect 
the university’s approach to vision, policies, and behavior and 
the lack of consistency among them and with federal policy. 
IV. ALIGNING VISION WITH POLICIES AND BEHAVIOR 
AND WITH THE OBJECTIVES OF BAYH-DOLE AND 
FEDERAL POLICY 
Some universities successfully deploy a broad-based, 
holistic approach to advance their innovations and fulfill their 
responsibilities under Bayh-Dole, as recipients of federal grant 
dollars, and to society generally.  They frequently have an 
awareness of themselves that informs their policies and guides 
their behavior.  Some of these universities and their efforts pre-
date Bayh-Dole, and there is much that can be learned from 
them, including their continuous efforts to react to, influence, 
and benefit from frequently changing laws, court cases, 
administrative policies, technology, knowledge, infrastructure, 
personnel, etc. 
Universities with quality reputations for advancing 
innovation—for instance, Stanford, University of California-
Berkeley, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (“MIT”), and 
Wisconsin’s WARF (“Wisconsin Alumni Research 
Foundation”)— have unique and sometimes polar opposite 
approaches to advancing innovation.  Each has developed 
different models and approaches customized to its unique 
priorities and circumstances.  Their models work for them 
because they have either evolved over time in conjunction with 
their research prominence and cultures, or they have been 
                                                          
 94. See MOWERY ET AL., supra note 19, at 58, 72. 
 95. One of the most significant problems in the licensing process is that 
the participants do not know or understand each others’ work environments, 
procedures, terminology, rewards, constraints, etc. SCHACHT, 33527, supra 
note 7, at 3; see also PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL 2008, supra note 12, at 3 and 33 
(barriers to university-industry collaboration and innovation include 
“misalignment of cultures, management structures, and goals; as well as 
differences in the policies that apply to IP, proprietary information, and 
publication”). 
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thoughtfully and strategically developed to take advantage of 
strengths and compensate for weaknesses.96  Likely, it is a 
combination of both.  However, trying to import Stanford’s, 
WARF’s, or MIT’s model will likely fail because—at the risk of 
stating the obvious—there is no single, universal way for a 
university to advance its innovations; there is no “silver bullet” 
and what works in one ecosystem may not work under different 
circumstances.97 
That being said, there are certain common themes to be 
derived from others’ efforts.  The discussion that follows is 
based on lessons learned from at least eleven studies involving 
a total of 128 different universities (many of which participated 
in several studies),98 independent research and interviews, and 
                                                          
 96. Cf. Carl J. Schramm, Making the Turn: Entrepreneurial Capitalism 
and Its European Promise, 72 VITAL SPEECHES OF THE DAY, 480, 486 (2006) 
(encouraging countries to learn from each other but to develop tailored 
policies). 
 97. Id. at 482 (“Danger, or at least disappointment, awaits those who 
attempt singular policy solutions.”); Mark L. Gordon, University Controlled or 
Owned Technology: The State of Commercialization and Recommendations, 30 
J.C. & U.L. 641, 658 (2004) (“there is no one optimal structure for programs of 
this type.”); TORNATZKY ET AL., supra note 2, at 9 (noting that these 
relationships have pluralistic and individually tailored approaches that 
consider internal and external cultures, customs, and experiences); NILSSON 
ET AL., supra note 35, at 7, 12 (changing a single factor such as ownership of 
intellectual property is not likely to be a “magic bullet” but must address a 
number of mechanisms collectively); NILSSON ET AL., supra note 35, at 22 
(“There is no such thing as a single US model, but an array of different 
combinational elements.”) (quotation omitted); LAMBERT & BUTLER, supra 
note 1, at 60 (“there is no a one-size-fits-all approach to governance.”); 
MOWERY ET AL., supra note 19, at 176 (“these . . .studies reveal great 
heterogeneity within even a small sample of technologies.”); PALMINTERA, 
supra note 2, at viii (“a successful practice in one environment may not be a 
successful practice in another since resources, cultures, environments and 
priorities vary from university to university, community to community, and 
state to state.”); Andrew Nelson & Thomas Byers, Organizational Modularity 
and Intra-University Relationships Between Entrepreneurship Education and 
Technology Transfer in UNIVERSITY ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND TECHNOLOGY 
TRANSFER: PROCESS, DESIGN, AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 275, 303 (Gary 
Libecap ed., 2005) (approaches to technology transfer are context dependent); 
see also PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL 2008, supra note 12, at 4, 33, 37 (there is no 
“one-size-fits-all” approach or “ideal structure” for successful university-
industry relationships). 
 98. Excluding Markman et al.’s study of 128 university technology 
transfer offices and Siegel’s study of 113, the remaining nine studies analyzed 
forty-four universities. Coffman et al., supra note 2, at 4–7 (Cornell 
University); Gordon, supra note 97, at 650–56 (University of Wisconsin-
Madison,Wisconsin, Stanford University, University of Illinois, University of 
Notre Dame, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, University of 
Cambridge); Harrington, supra note 31, at 800 & n.103 (University of North 
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experience negotiating with and on behalf of universities. 
Three common characteristics seem to emerge about 
universities that successfully advance their innovations.  First, 
these universities know themselves—who they are and who 
they want to be.  Adjuncts to this self-awareness are 
understandings of the realities of revenue potential and risk 
allocation. Universities build their vision and culture on this 
knowledge and awareness.  In addition, these universities 
implement policies and pursue behavior consistent with and in 
furtherance of their informed vision and desired culture. 
A. KNOW YOURSELF 
Many factors shape university efforts to advance their 
innovation: leadership, personnel, resources (financial and 
otherwise), policies, procedures, vision, laws and regulations—
in other words, an entire ecosystem.  As with other ecosystems, 
the components and their relative influence vary from 
institution to institution.  Consequently, it is critical that each 
institution know itself so that it may best assess the 
appropriate strategies to pursue and the cultural, personnel, 
                                                          
Carolina system, University of Massachusetts-Amherst, University of 
Missouri-Columbia, University of California system, University of Illinois 
system, Miami University (of Ohio), New York University, Harvard 
University, Yale University, Duke University); Markman et al., supra note 11, 
at 260 (128 universities); Nelson, supra note 75, at 14 (Stanford University, 
University of California system, and Columbia University); NILSSON ET AL., 
supra note 35, at 65, 72 (University of Pennsylvania, University of North 
Carolina-Chapel Hill); PALMINTERA, supra note 2, at 21 (Carnegie Mellon 
University, Georgia Tech, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Purdue 
University, Stanford University, University of California-San Diego, 
University of Pennsylvania, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Washington 
University in St. Louis); PAYTAS, ET AL., supra note 2, at 35–94 (University of 
Michigan, Wright State University (Dayton), New Mexico State, University, 
Lehigh University (Allentown), West Virginia University, Virginia Tech, 
University of Northern Iowa (Cedar Falls), Florida State University); Siegel 
Study, supra note 29, at 16 (113 universities); Jerry G. Thursby & Marie C. 
Thursby, Pros and Cons of Faculty Participation in Licensing, in UNIVERSITY 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: PROCESS, DESIGN, AND 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 187, 198–99 (Gary C. Libecap ed., 2005) (Cornell 
University, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, University of 
Pennsylvania, Purdue University, Texas A&M University, University of 
Wisconsin-Madison); TORNATZKY ET AL., supra note 2, at 3 (Carnegie Mellon 
University, Georgia Tech, North Carolina State, University, Ohio State 
University, Pennsylvania State University, Purdue University, Stanford 
University, Texas A&M University, University of Wisconsin, Virginia Tech, 
University of California-San Diego, University of Utah). 
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and other changes it needs to make for success.  In particular, 
universities with strong reputations for advancing their 
innovations know their research strengths and capacity, and 
they recognize the role of technology transfer in fulfilling the 
university’s overall mission. 
1. Quality Research 
As former president of Harvard University Derek Bok, 
Anna Nilsson and her colleagues from the Swedish Institute for 
Growth Policy Studies, and others have recognized, the 
university builds its framework for advancing innovation on 
the quality of the underlying research being done.99  Without 
high quality research and outcomes to feed the pipeline, 
nothing else matters in this area.100  Quality research can exist 
without effective advancing innovation—as is often the actual 
case—but effective, credible advancing innovation (or even the 
technology transfer subset) cannot exist without quality 
research. 
Two of the most important drivers of quality research are 
the credentials and quality of the researchers.101  The 
researchers’ reputations for integrity also can be as important 
as the substantive methodology, results, or assessments. 
Although not a legitimate excuse for universities to tolerate 
bureaucracy, industry is likely to put up with some level of 
                                                          
 99. NILSSON ET AL., supra note 35, at 7; BOK, supra note 31, at 106 
(“Research universities are rarely, if ever, any better than their faculties.”); 
PALMINTERA, supra note 2, at ix (“Excellent university technology transfer is 
built on excellent research.”); Thursby & Thursby, supra note 98, at 192 
(without faculty there would be no inventions to license). 
 100. See WASHBURN, supra note 47, at 187–88 (“The university can be a 
driving force if it’s a great center for science—not if it’s a great center for 
technology transfer. Technology transfer is . . . a secondary objective at best, 
probably even a third-level objective. Anybody that moves it to a higher-level 
objective than that is foolhardy. Because they will corrupt the university for 
sure.”) (quoting Michael Crow, formerly of Columbia University’s Office of 
Technology Transfer and current President of the Arizona State University) 
(emphasis omitted) (alteration in original). 
 101. Id. at 186 (“[T]he faculty that have been the most successful 
commercially are the best scientists that we have. Not, you know, among the 
best, but the best—those who’ve made the most fundamental research 
breakthroughs.”) (quoting Michael Crow, formerly of Columbia University 
Office of Technology Transfer and current President of Arizona State 
University); Nelson, supra note 75, at 3 (noting that all three of the 
universities studied—Stanford, California, and Columbia—”place a very high 
premium on the scientific reputation of their faculty. The research that is done 
there, and the faculty that is selected and tenured, reflect these criteria . . .”). 
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inefficiency and bureaucracy to work with the right, reputable 
researchers.  Therefore, to a large degree, the path to 
“enlightenment”—at least in this field—begins with identifying 
and assessing the strengths of the research being conducted 
and recruiting needs to attract and retain new personnel, 
facilities, and other resources to more fully develop research 
potential. 
2. A Vision That Drives Behavior 
Armed with an understanding of research priorities and 
potential, successful universities know and understand what 
they want from their advancing innovation programs.102  Is the 
goal money, service to society, fulfillment of fundamental 
teaching and research missions, keeping a given professor 
happy, or something else entirely? How does the institution 
view advancing innovation—as something technical and 
procedural or as something organizational and cultural?103  The 
answers to these and other questions and the process by which 
the questions are answered frequently influence, if not dictate, 
policies and behavior, staffing decisions, allocation of resources, 
and priorities—all of which in turn influence whether a 
university is maximizing its innovative potential.104 
                                                          
 102. NILSSON ET AL., supra note 35, at 49 (explaining that without clarity 
of purpose, universities cannot structure activities in a way most suitable for 
achieving goals, including in allocating resources, technological emphasis, 
modes of transfer, information flow, organizational design, and human 
resources strategies); BOK, supra note 31, at 6 (“[A] university must have a 
clear sense of the values needed to pursue its goals with a high degree of 
quality and integrity. When the values become blurred and begin to lose their 
hold, the urge to make money quickly spreads throughout the institution.”); 
Siegel & Phan, supra note 35, at 3 (noting that university leaders should 
consider technology transfer from a strategic perspective, driven by long term 
goals); Siegel & Phan, supra note 35, at 29 (saying that strategic approach to 
technology transfer includes establishing institutional goals and priorities, 
allocation of resources, organizational design and structure, human resource 
management practices, and reward systems); Brett M. Frischmann, 
Commercializing University Research Systems in Economic Perspective: A 
View from the Demand Side, in UNIVERSITY ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND 
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: PROCESS, DESIGN, AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
155, 178–80, 182 (Gary Libecap ed., 2005) (noting that each university must 
determine its own ideology and mission, including how to proceed based on the 
university’s objectives for science and research systems determined after 
careful evaluation of the immediate context, giving consideration to their role 
in society and how they compare with other institutions and social contexts). 
 103. See Coffman et al., supra note 2, at 3. 
 104. MOWERY ET AL., supra note 19, at 189 (“It is important that university 
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Some people look for answers to these questions in 
university or department vision, mission, or goal statements. 
The presence of appropriate words can be useful as an objective 
statement of priority, as are statements by university 
leadership in speeches and articles. For instance, Mary Sue 
Coleman, Ph.D., the President of the University of Michigan, 
offers one admirable perspective to explain why her institution 
participates in technology transfer: 
Many people are often confused about why we are interested in 
technology commercialization, in nurturing startup companies, and in 
facilitating more patents and license agreements. It is not about the 
promise of future revenues that might be generated from this 
activity. . . . It is not about the money. Technology transfer must serve 
our core mission: sharing ideas and innovations in the service of 
society’s well-being.105 
The right words in the right places, however, are not 
enough.  As in other areas of life, words alone can have little 
meaning, and they become a liability if they are not accurately 
and consistently reflected in policies and behavior.106 
                                                          
administrators recognize that technology transfer and licensing are 
components of and subsidiary to their central institutional missions of 
education and research. . . [and that] university policies must be consistent 
with this understanding as well.”); PALMINTERA, supra note 2, at x (detailing 
that an entrepreneurial culture is “perhaps the strongest and most pervasive 
influence on [university] technology transfer and commercialization 
performance” as evidenced by implicit and/or explicit rewards and incentives 
for faculty and hiring practices that favor industry and entrepreneurial 
experience). 
 105. W. Mark Crowell, A Message From the President, in AUTM, U.S. 
LICENSING SURVEY: FY 2004 (Ashley J. Stevens et al. eds., 2005), available at 
http://www.immagic.com/eLibrary/ARCHIVES/GENERAL/AUTM_US/A05121
6S.pdf [hereinafter AUTM 2004]  (message from AUTM’s then-president, 
Mark Crowell) (quoting University of Michigan President Mary Sue Coleman, 
Ph.D. during 2005 AUTM Annual Meeting) (internal paragraph structure 
omitted); see also SCHACHT, 32076, supra note 2, at 27 (“[I]t should not be 
overlooked that university inventions, arising, as most of them do, from basic 
research, have led to many products which have or exhibit the capability of 
saving lives or of improving the lives, safety and health of the citizens of the 
United States and around the world. In that context their contribution to 
society is immeasurable.”) (quoting Howard Bremer, patent counsel to 
Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation from 1960–1988) (citation omitted). 
 106. See Edward Soule, Managing Ethical Performance in Organizations: 
Insights from the Corporate World, 74 CLEV. CLINIC J. MED. (SUPP.) S73, S75 
(2007) (asserting that calls for ethical conduct are only as good as the culture 
in which they operate and amount to little more than cheerleading without 
systematic management of ethical performance); Ehringhuas et al., supra note 
70, at S77-S78 (citing example of Paul O’Neill who, upon becoming chief 
executive officer of Alcoa, identified worker safety as a priority and then 
terminated a highly ranked superstar who failed to report an injury within 24 
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Inconsistency can damage an institution’s credibility and 
reputation. Pronouncements about advancing innovation being 
an institutional priority bespeak hypocrisy when not matched 
by dedication of appropriate resources and the consistent 
implementation of policies and behaviors,107 which ultimately 
evidences the priority given advancing innovation.108 
When there is alignment, the reputation, culture and 
results can be powerful and persuasive.109  Of course, obtaining 
and maintaining such alignment is hard work and takes 
time.110  The understanding of and vision for how advancing 
innovation fits the university mission must include patience, 
tolerance for a certain amount of ambiguity, and no expectation 
of short-term, quick fixes111  One goal must be to implement 
                                                          
hours of its occurrence as required by the safety rules); TORNATZKY, ET AL., 
supra note 2, at 18–20. 
 107. Siegel & Phan, supra note 35, at 3 (considering technology transfer 
from a strategic perspective implies providing sufficient resources to achieve 
the objectives); see also SIEGEL STUDY, supra note 29, at 33 (conveying that 
researchers report that rigid, cumbersome and unclear policies impede 
technology transfer). 
 108. Patrick Jones & Stephen O’Neil, Can the TTO Manage its own 
Disintermediation?, KAUFFMAN THOUGHTBOOK 2007, at 166, 166 (2007) (the 
mission of technology transfer offices is frequently subject to misalignment, 
which results in increased attention to commercial innovations and money 
resulting in overprotecting other things). 
 109. While an appropriate vision consistent with behaviors can contribute 
greatly to efforts to advance university innovation, many in the field struggle 
with administrations that either do not realize the importance of the need for 
vision or for advancing innovation at all. If that is the case, there are several 
ways to try to elicit vision from the administration and, maybe even more 
importantly, influence what that vision might be. Among these are to ask 
questions and, in putting the questions in context, making sure that the 
administration understands that multiple options and approaches exist. They 
may believe that there is only one vision—money. As is made more clear later, 
there is not much money (relatively) in technology transfer, and the money 
that is made usually results from a convergence of fortuitous circumstances 
and a supportive ecosystem. Second, the benefits of looking beyond the 
primary sources of money can be material, but they flow from a vision, policies 
and behavior that recognize the non-monetary benefits of advancing 
innovation, such as better educational experiences for students, the ability to 
attract high quality researchers for faculty, and an enhanced reputation for 
success. 
 110. PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL 2003 , supra note 1, at 10 (introducing a 
successful commercialization program requires considerable time of ten years 
or greater). 
 111. NILSSON ET AL., supra note 35, at 7 (“complexity . . . demands a 
strategic plan with a long-term view.”); see also PALMINTERA, supra note 2, at 
xi; PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL 2003, supra note 1, at 9 (commercialization tools 
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vision with policies and behaviors—including performance 
measures, negotiating strategies, allocation of resources, etc.—
that appropriately convey the promise of advancing university 
innovation as a priority in the university’s pursuit of its entire 
mission, not just revenue. 
3. Understanding Financial and Revenue Realities 
In the scheme of things, there is not much money to be 
gained from advancing innovation.112  Of course, when people 
see that universities have spawned Google, Yahoo, Gatorade, 
vitamin D, Lycos, Genentech and other financial blockbusters, 
many involved expect more innovations to yield similar 
returns.113  This has the unfortunate effect of imposing 
unrealistic expectations on technology transfer offices and 
placing undue emphasis on money, which then also contributes 
to the one-window view and linear, old economy performance 
measures discussed above.114  Such attribution also encourages 
                                                          
need to allow flexibility in a “rapidly changing environment”); Boettiger & 
Bennett, supra note 10, at 273 (maturing a portfolio of university intellectual 
property can take years); Boettiger & Bennett, supra note 10, at 274, 279 
(long-term commitment of time and money). 
 112. See BOK, supra note 24, at 77; see also NILSSON ET AL., supra note 35, 
at 11 (discouraging university participation based on a profit motive: “it is 
risky and few universities profit from it”) (citing Thursby & Thursby, supra 
note 98); Behfar Bastani et al., Technology Transfer in Nanotechnology: 
Licensing Intellectual Property from Universities to Industry, 1 NANOTECH. L. 
& BUS. 166, 167 (2004) (“In general, income from licensing is fairly small in 
comparison to a university’s total budget, or even in comparison to a 
university’s sponsored research budget.”); LAMBERT & BUTLER, supra note 1, 
at 51; MOWERY ET AL., supra note 19, at 6; cf. Philip A. Pizzo, Fostering 
Innovation Without Compromising Integrity, 74 CLEV. CLINIC J. MED. (SUPP.) 
S10, S11 (2007) (reporting that the number of patents that have a huge yield is 
very low; they get all the attention, but there are hundreds if not thousands 
that fail or basically go nowhere); Siepmann, supra note 1, at 235; Ritchie de 
Larena, supra note 10, at 1431. 
 113. SCHRAMM, supra note 26, at 138 (noting “that many schools have  
unrealistic perceptions of the economic importance of their faculties’ 
research”); see also MOWERY ET AL., supra note 19, at 84; BOK, supra note 31, 
at 77; Libecap, supra note 34 at xii (citing Mowery about unrealistic 
expectations universities have about licensing revenue). 
 114. See Markman et al., supra note 11, at 251 (“Many universities instruct 
their [technology transfer offices] to focus primarily on developing their 
royalty stream.”); Markman et al., supra note 11, at 253 (“the expressed 
purpose of most [technology transfer offices] is to generate rents from scientific 
discovery . . . .”); Boettiger & Bennett, supra note 10, at 273 (explaining that 
university focus on income generation has in part shaped the functioning of 
technology transfer in the United States); Boettiger & Bennett, supra note 10, 
at 280 (noting that performance metrics based on revenue and numbers 
distort the decision-making process of technology transfer staff); Arti K. Rai & 
TYLER.WEB 2/20/2009  4:18:10 PM 
180 MINN J.L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 10:1 
 
 
a tendency to forget (at best) or ignore that these 
breakthroughs resulted from an entire innovation ecosystem, 
and the problem is exacerbated by companies, investors, and 
politicians that also expect “home runs.” 
According to a 2004 study by the Association of University 
Technology Managers, the most recent of its studies to present 
this data, only about one-third of participating universities 
(66/187) had one or more licenses that produced more than $1 
million in income in 2004.115  Less than two percent of 
participating universities (3/187) had ten or more licenses that 
produced $1 million in income in 2004.116  According to 
research by two noted authorities on technology transfer—
Marie Thursby, Ph.D., who holds the Hal and John Smith 
Chair in Entrepreneurship at the Georgia Institute of 
Technology and is executive director of the University’s 
TI:GER® program discussed later, and Jerry Thursby, who 
holds the Ernest Scheller, Jr. Chair in Innovation, 
Entrepreneurship, and Commercialization at Georgia Tech—
only forty percent of disclosures lead to licenses, and fewer than 
half of those generate any income.117  They also found that, on 
average, the top five income generating licenses were 
responsible for about seventy-six percent of total licensing 
income.118 
It is simply not possible or realistic to consistently expect 
that the university can predict such “home runs,” a 
complaint/reality that predates passage of the Bayh-Dole Act. 
This does not mean that such revenue is not worth pursuing. 
This is, after all, real money and it provides real opportunities, 
even if amounts at a given university may not rise to the level 
of materiality in the typical research university’s budget. 
                                                          
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress of Biomedicine, 66 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289, 306 (2003) (asserting that technology transfer 
office personnel “see their primary job as bringing in licensing revenue,” an 
important criteria by which their performance is assessed); Carl Schramm, 
Accelerating Technology Transfer and Commercialization, Address to the 
Intellectual Property Commercialization and Research Spinouts Conference 4 
(Nov. 4, 2004). 
 115. AUTM 2004, supra note 105, at 26. 
 116. Id. Very few universities make money from commercialization.  See 
WASHBURN, supra note 47, at 169; Bagley, supra note 51, at 234; Nelson, 
supra note 75, at 17 (citing the myth that universities can expect a lot of 
money from patenting and licensing). 
 117. Thursby & Thursby, supra note 98, at 190. 
 118. Id. 
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Some might suggest that universities should focus on 
trying to identify and pursue their top five revenue generating 
innovations. If the sole goal is money, they might be right, but 
chasing elusive financial “home runs” risk losing what could be 
important opportunities for “base hits” that advance human 
welfare and generate profit in smaller increments, but 
potentially larger aggregates. Even worse, research results that 
could be the equivalent of human welfare “home runs” gather 
cobwebs.  Keeping monetary gains in perspective helps 
universities prioritize better and operate more consistently 
with federal policy.119  It also reduces the risk of criticism that 
overall university missions are managed by venture capitalists. 
Monetary results should be pursued under the right 
circumstances and as part of an overall strategy—rather than 
as the strategy.120 
                                                          
 119. See, e.g., BOK, supra note 31, at 141; Siegel & Phan, supra note 35, at 
30 (citing the idea of managing licensing portfolio as a set of options, not 
individual wagers on “winner-takes-all” projects); Strandburg, supra note 49, 
at 97 (noting that it is impossible to predict which research will lead to 
important, or even revolutionary, advances, ensuring that they occur depends 
on having a broad portfolio of research investments); see also PRESIDENT’S 
COUNCIL 2008, supra note 12, at 28 (encouraging a volume model instead of a 
“home run” or income model to approach negotiation of technology rights); 
Crow, supra note 13, at 24 (explaining that a strategic objective Arizona State 
University for its advancing innovation efforts is to focus on “deal flow density 
rather than revenue” and in “the number of investions and discoveries 
actually moved into use, instated of trying to maximize near term income from 
fewer, bigger deals”). 
 120. See WASHBURN, supra note 47, at 156 (“More and more, our nation’s 
leading universities are behaving in ways that suggest money is what 
ultimately guides their decision making.”). In dealing with for profit 
enterprises, it is arguably mandated by law that tax exempt universities elicit 
at least fair market value from for profit enterprises in order to protect against 
allegations of private benefit and/or that they are serving other than 
charitable purposes. See Gordon, supra note 97, at 664–65; see also 
PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL 2008, supra note 12, at 72 (universities must operate 
within the parameters of Federal and State rules, including “non-profit tax 
rules”). 
In September 2008, the Internal Revenue Service sent a “Compliance 
Questionnaire” to approximately 400 colleges and universities in the United 
States.  In the Questionnaire, among other things, the IRS asks for 
information about university policies regarding transactions with related 
organizations and revenue generated from royalties, exclusive use contracts, 
commercial research, patents, copyrights and trade names or trade secrets.  
See Internal Revenue Service, Compliance Questionnaire Colleges and 
Universities, Form 14018, 6, 11–19 (Sep. 2008), available at 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/sample_cucp_questionnaire.pdf. 
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4. Risk Allocation and Failure Rates 
Universities that successfully advance their innovations 
understand the extent to which industry takes risks, too. Often, 
university innovations are at a stage of development where 
there is a high degree of technical and, especially, market 
uncertainty.121  As a result, firms and investors frequently need 
to expend more time and money conducting research and 
testing.122  In one of her reports for Congress, Schacht 
estimates that research accounts for only twenty-five percent of 
the expense associated with commercializing a new good or 
service.123  In another, she reports that $1 of academic 
innovation requires about $10,000 of private capital to bring 
the innovation to market.124  Presumably, the university has 
proven the concept or theory, but others frequently must 
advance the concept or theory toward marketable stages.125 
It is possible that these additional expenditures could be 
lost. After all, not every idea is a good idea, and good ideas are 
not always marketable at a given time.126  Unless a pure 
                                                          
 121. NILSSON ET AL., supra note 35, at 16; see also MOWERY ET AL., supra 
note 19, at 165, 167; Thursby & Thursby, supra note 98, at 190 (only seven 
percent of licensed technologies ready for practical or commercial use); id. at 
204 (university research years away from potential revenue); Bagley, supra 
note 51, at 247, 250, 264 (university inventions disclosed at an very early 
stage with uncertain commercial potential and uncertain viability); Nelson, 
supra note 75, at 15–16 (uses for embryonic inventions are too wide, gains are 
too uncertain, and path to practical use is long and poorly mapped). But see 
Markman et al., supra note 11, at 250–54 (seventy-two percent of surveyed 
technology transfer offices use licensing for cash as their principal strategy 
where technologies are at the prototype stage for which the market has been 
identified). 
 122. See, e.g., MOWERY ET AL., supra note 19, at 168; Siegel, supra note 30, 
at 123; Pulsinelli, supra note 79, at 412 (development costs typically greatly 
exceeding research costs). 
 123. SCHACHT, 33527, supra note 1, at 3; see also SCHACHT, 32076, supra 
note 2, at 4 (“Studies indicate that research funding accounts for 
approximately one-quarter of the costs associated with brining a new product 
to market.”). 
 124. SCHACHT, 32076, supra note 2, at 4. 
 125. See Schramm, supra note 114, at 4. 
 126. A case in point is the example of portable, rapid anthrax detection and 
Midwest Research Institute in Kansas City, Missouri (“MRI”). MRI developed 
technology to efficiently detect airborne anthrax particles. While this seemed 
like a good idea, it was not marketable at the time of development. Decades 
after development, but only a few years ago, terrorists used the mail to 
contaminate facilities with anthrax. Suddenly, a dormant good idea became 
marketable and MRI responded quickly to make the technology available. This 
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human welfare approach is worth the financial cost—and it 
may not be for most for-profit enterprises—business is most 
often looking for opportunities to recapture its investment and 
then some.  These are market realities, and they 
understandably encumber thinking in a market context. 
However, this thinking should not be used to excuse failure to 
pursue the non-economic benefits of university research, 
particularly when there is a growing trend of private 
foundations, wealthy individuals, and social enterprises 
focusing on maximizing broader potential and benefits.127 
In their survey of entrepreneurs and business, Siegel and 
his colleagues report that the most frequent complaint from 
entrepreneurs is the university’s lack of understanding of the 
business,128 which could include its risks, needs, and cultures. 
Of course, Siegel also points out that the most frequent 
complaint from researchers, university administrators, and 
technology transfer personnel was that industry did not 
understand university culture, needs, and risks.129 
While the university does take some limited risks, it can 
dramatically enhance negotiations and relationships when the 
university and its personnel understand the nature of the risks 
business is taking, including the high degree of market failures 
for even good ideas.  This understanding should influence the 
university’s vision and expectations, and it should inform 
behavior, including the terms of transfer documents associated 
with valuation and pricing, intellectual property strategies, and 
allocating liability. 
5. Personnel 
Universities with reputations for advancing their 
innovations also seem to have the right personnel with the 
right skills in the right positions, whether as researchers, 
administrators, or advancing innovation professionals.130  For 
                                                          
type of convergence does not always occur but being prepared for its 
possibilities can be both smart and worthwhile.  Telephone interview with Dr. 
James Spigarelli, President & Chief Executive Officer, Midwest Research Inst. 
(Oct. 27, 2009); Telephone interview with Jeanie Latz, former Gen. Counsel & 
Corp. Sec’y, Midwest Research Inst. (Oct. 9, 2006). 
 127. See discussion infra note 166 and accompanying text. 
 128. Siegel, supra note 30, at 118 (tbl.2); SIEGEL STUDY, supra note 29, at 
31. 
 129. Siegel, supra note 30, at 118 (tbl.2). 
 130. Siegel & Phan, supra note 35, at 2 (asserting that technology transfer 
effectiveness ultimately depends on competencies of the people involved—
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instance, universities must be wary of turning excellent 
researchers into only half-way decent entrepreneurs,131 and in 
doing so possibly sacrificing quality innovation in pursuit of 
mediocre business. 
Such universities also actively pursue “cross-pollination” 
and “bundling” among researchers and institutions and across 
fields and boundaries with the expectation and result that 
innovation is more likely to occur with interdisciplinary 
programs than in the silos that normally exist.132  For instance, 
Stanford University has a program jointly run by the 
engineering and medical schools that forms teams of four from 
among their recent graduates.133  These teams then immerse 
themselves in Stanford’s hospital.134  After two months, they 
are expected to make three hundred suggestions for 
improvement either in the practice of medicine or in 
administration.135  Teams of medical personnel or engineers 
alone, without the benefit of the “cross pollination,” may not be 
likely to find three hundred suggestions and the quality of the 
suggestions would likely be lower. 
Georgia Tech established an interdisciplinary program it 
calls TI:GER—Technical Innovation: Generating Economic 
Results.136  In this program, Georgia Tech places Ph.D. 
students in science and engineering on teams with MBA and 
law students.137  The goals of the program are to graduate 
technically proficient science and engineering Ph.D.s who have 
a multidisciplinary perspective, to produce thesis research of 
scientific merit and market relevance, and to expose MBA and 
                                                          
scientists, entrepreneurs, technology transfer personnel, administration—and 
their incentives to engage in entrepreneurial activity). 
 131. See NILSSON ET AL., supra note 35, at 12 (universities’ primary tasks 
are research and education). 
 132. See id. at 50; Libecap, supra note 34, at xviii (citing the Stanford 
experience to demonstrate the importance of integrating interdisciplinary 
programs); see also PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL 2008, supra note 12, at 34 (one 
experience common to the successful university-industry partnerships studied 
was the “cross fertilization of individuals with experience in government, 
academic, or industrial sectors”); PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL 2008, supra note 12, 
at 37–63 (discussing various university-industry and industry-industry 
collaboration experiences). 
 133. SCHRAMM, supra note 26, at 84. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Libecap, supra note 34, at xvii. 
 137. Thursby, supra note 1, at 212. 
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law students to the challenges that arise in fundamental 
research and commercialization.138  As these students pursue 
careers in managing research and development, intellectual 
property law, or leadership in industry or at universities, they 
should be better equipped to engage and pursue technology 
transfer, hopefully contributing to more effective and more 
efficient relationships and processes. 
As for personnel responsible for advancing the innovations, 
much has been written theorizing about the types of people who 
are effective in those roles.  Relevant studies approach the 
issue based on surveys of people from business, administration, 
researchers, and technology transfer office personnel.  Even 
though based on subjective reporting, there seems to be a 
certain amount of reasonable advice that can be extrapolated 
from the research.139 
Reminiscent of Barbási’s research cited earlier, European 
researchers identify the critical skill for technology transfer 
personnel as one of “building bridges” between university 
researchers and business.140  Others, such as Siegel and his 
colleagues, have similarly identified networking skills as 
critical and have characterized the role as “boundary 
spanners.”141  A related sub-specialty, if you will, is the role of 
recognizing opportunities or at least building connections and 
networks to serve this fundamental entrepreneurial 
prerequisite.142 
In order to do this, those in advancing innovation must 
simultaneously earn and build trust from the researchers and 
from those in business143—a significant but surmountable 
challenge even with the sometimes competing and even 
mutually exclusive philosophies and perspectives of each. 
However, it can be done, and there are several ways to 
accomplish it.  Among those are by regular interactions, 
demonstrated efforts to understand perspectives, tangible 
attempts to pursue outcomes that motivate, and appropriate 
                                                          
 138. Id. at 217. 
 139. See infra notes 140––146. 
 140. CREST REPORT, supra note 50, at 65, 76. 
 141. Siegel, supra note 30, at 122; Siegel, supra note 31, at 121; see also 
Siegel & Phan, supra note 35, at 4, 34. 
 142. Siegel, supra note 31, at 121; Schramm, supra note 114, at 6. 
 143. See GOVERNMENT-UNIVERSITY-INDUSTRY RESEARCH ROUNDTABLE, 
NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI. ET AL., OVERCOMING BARRIERS TO COLLABORATIVE 
RESEARCH: REPORT OF A WORKSHOP 2 (1999). 
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respect for and implementation of ethical behavior.  Some have 
suggested that earning trust may be the most important factor 
for technology transfer personnel, but trust is much less a 
single characteristic than a coalescing of the right combination 
of character, skill, experience, and networks. Trust also takes 
time to build and maintain, unless the people in or hired to the 
positions have already earned the requisite levels and types of 
trust by reputation. 
The European researchers also identify a core set of skills 
that they suggest should be taught in formal courses.  The 
skills run a significant gamut and include business 
development, intellectual property management, negotiating, 
networking, contracting, coaching, finance, and others.144  
While it may be impossible to find any one person who 
possesses these diverse skills at a high performance level, 
certainly the right team of people could be found with 
complementary skills. 
The Muenster University of Applied Sciences in Germany 
took a different route. They appointed a marketing expert as 
director of technology transfer rather than a lawyer, 
entrepreneur, engineer, bureaucrat, or scientist.145  At the time 
of his appointment, he was the only European director whose 
core competency was marketing.146 
There is an even more fundamental issue as it relates to 
personnel for the advancing innovation office.  These offices 
and efforts should have an appropriate number of qualified 
people and sufficient resources.  Frequently, technology 
transfer offices are understaffed and their resources (and jobs) 
are based on the revenue they generate.  Both factors motivate 
personnel to focus excessively on money, including devoting 
scarce attention only to those innovations that are most likely 
to raise the most revenue.  In the process, one-size-fits-all 
approaches become normal, potentially life altering innovations 
can be ignored, and technology transfer can be perceived as 
anathema to, instead of complementary of, academia.  Actual 
staffing and resources for the technology transfer office say 
more about the university administration’s philosophy 
regarding innovation and federal policy than any words that 
                                                          
 144. CREST REPORT, supra note 50, at 65, 76. 
 145. Interview with Dr. Thomas Baaken, Dir. of Tech. Transfer, Muenster 
Univ. of Applied Sciences, in F.R.G., (Oct. 20, 2006). 
 146. Id. 
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might be used. 
The right people with the right skills and perspectives can 
make or break a transaction, and they can build or inhibit trust 
as the foundation of relationships.  There is only so much that 
the quality of the research or the university’s reputation can do 
to compensate for poorly placed and/or under-resourced 
personnel.  Universities should ensure that their policies and 
behavior allow them to recruit and retain the right people for 
their vision of advancing innovation, including appropriate 
measures of and rewards for successfully implementing the 
university’s vision and federal policy. 
V. POLICIES AND BEHAVIOR CONSISTENT WITH AND 
DERIVED FROM A VISION FOR ADVANCING 
INNOVATION 
One of the biggest challenges all universities face in their 
efforts to advance innovation is sculpting a culture of 
innovation using the right policies and behaviors and changing 
those that are counterproductive or outdated.147  Even 
Stanford, which is frequently mentioned as among the best, 
had to recognize that its policies and behavior may have been 
inhibiting efforts to advance its innovations.148  Two anecdotes 
from my experience as a practicing lawyer illustrate some of 
the typical policy and behavioral challenges.  Of course, not all 
of my experiences have been inappropriately difficult or 
unnecessarily time consuming or expensive, and positive 
experiences also are instructive in assessing university policies 
and behaviors. 
A client wanted to donate a worthwhile innovation to a 
university.  It took nearly nine months for my client to give 
that innovation away as we worked through four different 
                                                          
 147. Gordon, supra note 97, at 672 (“[T]he challenge for each university is 
to structure the most beneficial commercialization program for its 
organization, balancing its needs and its mission of benefiting the public and 
its students with its technology commercialization efforts.”); see Crow, supra 
note 13, at 26 (Arizona State University has “instituted a number of 
institutional policies that promote entrepreneurship and make it easy to move 
ideas into action, consistent with the policies mentioned earlier relating to 
intellectual property commercialization. Conversely, policies that discourage 
entrepreneurial behavior are minimized”). 
 148. See TORNATZKY, supra note 2, at 160 (citing a 1995 faculty survey 
that reported “Stanford is perceived as one of the worst American universities 
to deal with, especially on the topic of ownership/patent status of intellectual 
property”). 
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offices at the university–legal, technology transfer, risk 
management, and administration.  We struggled through 
inconsistent positions among them with regard to such 
considerations as liability exposure, export control compliance, 
and representations and warranties.  We also had to deal with 
the university’s desire that my client indemnify the university 
for its activities in exploiting the innovation.  With regard to 
the last point, my client accepted responsibility for the 
originality of and non-infringement by the underlying 
intellectual property, but the university wanted my client to 
indemnify it for liability the university might incur as a direct 
result of actions by the university or within its control.  We 
finally completed the transaction, but the journey was more 
arduous, time consuming, and expensive than it needed to be. 
In another instance, a client wanted to license software 
from a university’s for-profit subsidiary.  My client decided to 
forgo alternative—possibly better—providers specifically in 
part to help this entity gain credibility and traction in the 
marketplace. Among other problems, the university wanted my 
client to indemnify it if its software was deemed infringing.  In 
addition, the university wanted to control and use all of the 
data collected using the software.  Other negotiating challenges 
included what my client believed to be the entity’s inflated view 
of the software’s financial value and a lack of understanding of 
(or desire to learn about) essential legally mandated 
restrictions peculiar to my client’s business.  Although we 
eventually negotiated the issues to a mutually agreeable end, 
everyone involved agreed that the process was more convoluted 
and difficult than it needed to be. 
In both of the above circumstances, the universities 
involved prided themselves on their vision for advancing 
innovation, but their policies and behavior inhibited 
implementing that vision.  Additionally, and as often seems to 
be the case, the above universities appeared to approach the 
transactions without regard to the specific circumstances, and 
they instead seemed to blindly apply generally held positions, 
even though inapplicable.   
A. POLICIES AND BEHAVIOR: LEGAL TOPICS 
Among the legal topics that most impact the intersection of 
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university policy and behavior are conflicts of interest,149 
intellectual property, liability, representations and warranties, 
export controls, and compliance with laws and regulations of 
the United States concerning tax exempt or governmental 
status.  Too frequently, universities may try to adopt one-size-
fits-all approaches to these multi-faceted and frequently 
complex legal issues.  Such behavior often may involve 
wholesale adaptations of something that is perceived to have 
worked for a different institution, or they may be broad-based 
extrapolations of something that happened to work in a unique, 
but unrelated, situation.  This can result in blanket practices 
such as “never” indemnifying, “always” requiring that the 
university be fully indemnified (even for its own actions), and 
“never” making certain representations regarding originality or 
non-infringement. 
Blanket practices usually seem to be implemented with the 
expectation or hope that they will streamline licensing, result 
in greater efficiency, and ultimately save money. 
Unfortunately, such practices, when applied rigidly and 
without analysis or exception, can interfere with licensing and 
increase the time and financial cost.  They can also be a 
disincentive to begin negotiations because of their effect in 
shifting risk and responsibility away from the university, even 
in cases when the university is in the best (and sometimes only) 
position to control the risk.  Such generic approaches and one-
sided practices usually run counter to and undermine federal 
policy and a purported vision that extols the virtues of 
advancing innovation. 
When inflexible practices are accompanied by a 
corresponding expectation that licensees also will pay high fees 
or make other compromises, the result can be disequilibrium, 
time consuming and costly negotiations, stagnating 
innovations, and frequently higher transaction and research 
costs.150  Protecting the university is important, but so is 
allowing society to benefit from the innovations harbored in 
university labs.  This is not to say that universities should be 
                                                          
 149. See discussion supra notes 35–65 and accompanying text. 
 150. See Baca, supra note 92, at *1 (transaction costs increase research 
costs and slow the pace of scientific progress); id. at *20, *24, *26 (protracted 
negotiations can be costly and time consuming and can cause the loss of 
research windows and grant opportunities and delays in progress and real 
science); Rai & Eisenberg¸ supra note 114, at 297 (transaction costs can mount 
quickly); Pulsinelli, supra note 79, at 431–32 (costs and delays in agreeing to 
license have an adverse impact on the research enterprise). 
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reckless or that they should not protect themselves; however, 
advancing innovation efforts would be significantly enhanced 
with legal practices and behavior that better balance university 
responsibility and fees with the actual benefits and allocation 
of risk, and the ability to manage that risk. Striking the right 
balance along the continuum is worth the struggle, particularly 
in the areas of intellectual property and liability.151 
1. Intellectual Property 
The universities best at advancing innovation understand 
that there are a variety of options when addressing intellectual 
property issues regarding ownership, exclusivity, use rights, 
and other matters.152  They also understand that different 
innovations may warrant different strategies; different stages 
of development afford varying degrees of leverage; and different 
market demands, risks, and opportunities may justify different 
tactics.153 
                                                          
 151. See, e.g., PALMINTERA, supra note 29, at ii (Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, Stanford University, Carnegie Mellon University, Georgia 
Institute of Technology appear to have found their balance and lead to attract 
star faculty and innovative minded students and faculty); Carl J. Schramm, 
Five Universities You Can Do Business With, INC. MAGAZINE, Feb. 2006, at 23 
(identifying California Institute of Technology, University of California–
Berkeley, Stanford University, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and 
University of Wisconsin as having found the right balance); see also 
PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL 2008, supra note 12, at 28 (identifying intellectual 
property negotiations as a “significant barrier and continual challenge” even 
among “extremely successful partnerships”). 
 152. Among questions that might be considered in helping to address 
ownership of sponsored research are the following: (1) Who proposed the 
project/collaboration in the first place?; (2) Who is paying for it?; (3) Who is 
taking the lead to organize the research? Design it? Conduct it?; (4) Is the 
research mission critical for university? For industry?; (5) Whose facilities? 
Equipment? Personnel?; (6) Will the research or reporting require access to 
privileged information of materials?; (7) How does the Project relate to prior 
work of industry? University? Researcher?; (8) What are the various 
applications/uses? What is the commercial potential? What fields of use? Are 
there specific geographic areas that might be more or less interested?; (9) How 
does ownership by one party restrict the other? Is there a “knock out effect”?; 
and (10) Are there other legal issues, such as contractual limitations, exempt 
organizations/IRS issues, etc.? See, CREST REPORT, supra note 50, at 49–53. 
 153. MOWERY ET AL., supra note 19, at 6 (“[P]rocesses of knowledge 
exchange and technology transfer are complex, and the channels through 
which these processes operate most effectively differ significantly among 
different fields of technology.”); MOWERY ET AL., supra note 19, at 34 (“[T]he 
evidence from expert surveys and other sources [] highlights the substantial 
differences among industries and fields of research and innovation.”); Arti K. 
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Much has been written about inherent differences in the 
desirability of patenting, and thereby more vigorously 
protecting, the underlying intellectual property of biomedical 
and pharmaceutical innovations when compared with advances 
in information technology and communication, technologies 
where time to market is more critical.154  Much of that 
discussion has occurred in the context of trying to document the 
                                                          
Rai et al., University Software Ownership: Technology Transfer or Business As 
Usual? 28 (Duke Law Sch. Sci., Tech. and Innovation Research Paper Series, 
Research Paper No. 20, 2007), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=996456 (“Ideally, we would 
want decisions about whether to patent publicly-funded academic research to 
be based not only on the private marginal costs of patent acquisition but on 
whether a patent is needed to facilitate commercialization in a specific case, 
which is likely to vary across inventions and fields.”); J. Strother Moore et al., 
Computing Research Ass’n., Best Practices Memo: University-Industry 
Sponsored Research Agreements 1 (Sept. 2003), 
http://www.cra.org/reports/ip/bestpractices.pdf  (distinguishing information 
technology from biomedical, pharmaceutical, and agricultural advances such 
that universities can introduce significant barriers to cooperation by forcing 
information technology into a standard patent-centric form); see also 
SCHACHT, 30320, supra note 2, at 3 (distinguishing pharmaceutical and 
biochemical areas where patents can be important from electronics, where 
they may not be); Siegel & Phan, supra note 35, at 29 (emphasizing stage of 
development and field of emphasis); Boettiger & Bennett, supra note 10, at 
279 (patent-licensing is one channel and should not be the limited focus of 
technology transfer efforts); Markman et al., supra note 11, at 249–55; see also 
PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL 2008, supra note 12, at 28 (industry is critical of some 
universities “for employing the same technology transfer approach for 
pharmaceutical- and biotechnology-related discoveries as they use for 
information technology inventions”). 
 154. See Mowery, supra note 30, at 3–4, 22–25; MOWERY ET AL., supra note 
19, at 178 (identifying the need to recognize differences among academic 
disciplines or research areas with economically significant incentives in 
biomedical research, but not as great a need in electronics and other areas), 
190–91 (“It is important for university research administrators to adjust their 
intellectual property policies to accommodate these intersectoral differences” 
which requires “pursuit of a broader and more flexible set of objectives 
through patenting and licensing policies, rather than focusing solely on 
licensing revenues.”); Moore et al., Computing Research Association, supra 
note 137, at 1–2; MOWERY ET AL., supra note 19, at 154, 178, 190–91 
(explaining need to recognize differences among academic disciplines or 
research areas with economically significant incentives in biomedical research 
but not as much in electronics and other areas; “It is important for university 
research administrators to adjust their intellectual property policies to 
accommodate these intersectoral differences” which requires “pursuit of a 
broader, more flexible set of objectives through patenting and licensing 
policies, rather than focusing solely on licensing revenues.”); see also 
SCHACHT, 32076, supra note 2, at 4; PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL 2003, supra note 1, 
at 11 (value of intellectual property to various industries is “highly variable”); 
SCHACHT, 32076, supra note 2, at 4; Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 114, at 302–
03 (citations omitted). 
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effectiveness of the Bayh-Dole Act.  However, it should not be 
Bayh-Dole that drives universities to patent; it should be the 
specific circumstances surrounding the intellectual property in 
question.  Bayh-Dole gives the freedom to patent and exploit, 
but it does not purport to replace judgment about when or 
whether to patent or how to exploit.  Patenting may be the best 
approach when it is essential to preserve a legitimate 
competitive advantage, to exploit the invention for substantial 
commercial or social gains or both, or to arm against 
infringement claims. 
Patenting may not be appropriate in other contexts or 
sometimes even if the above mentioned factors are present.  
Patenting is not the only intellectual property option available 
for protecting or exploiting university innovations.  The precise 
strategies deployed should depend on any number of factors, 
including the following: 
a. the likely commercial and non-commercial applications 
for the innovation, including uses for further research and 
exploration;155 
b. the possible commercial and social value; 
c. the extent to which further development is necessary to 
realize potential; 
d. the presence of a unique market demand or opportunity 
and even if a present or likely future market exists at all; 
e. the likely business interests, including ease to replicate 
and time to market;156 
f. the existing and likely competition, if any; 
g. whether protection inhibits or enhances basic 
research;157 
                                                          
 155. See also PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL 2003, supra note 1, at 16 (highlighting 
the need to balance protecting commercial value against access to tools for 
further research and exploration). 
 156. See PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL 2003, supra note 1, at 11. 
 157. Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 114, at 289, 296 (warning that patents on 
early stage discoveries can be broad and permit holders to control subsequent 
research); Baca, supra note 92, at *20, *24, *26. 
[L]ongstanding norms call for relatively unfettered access to 
fundamental knowledge developed by prior researchers. . . . The 
tradition of open science has eroded considerably over the past 
quarter century as proprietary claims have reached farther upstream 
from end products to cover fundamental discoveries that provide the 
knowledge base for future product development. 
Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 114, at 289. 
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h. the effective commercial life for the innovation;158 and 
i. the social and other costs associated with a 
preservationist approach. 
These factors help universities determine whether to 
patent, to assign, to license, or to make the innovation freely 
available as open source, through publication, or otherwise.  If 
the university pursues licensing, it then must determine 
whether the license should be exclusive or non-exclusive, 
limited in time or perpetual, limited in geography, limited to a 
particular use, or if the terms and restrictions should vary 
depending on whether the use is for commercial, academic 
research, or charitable purposes.159 
Part of the difficulty is that none of these decision factors 
happens in a vacuum, and it is unrealistic and even 
counterproductive to follow the adage—as economists are fond 
of saying—”all else being equal.”  Frequently, there are real 
risks, expenses, and opportunity costs that also must be 
considered.  All too often, there also are limited financial and 
human resources available within the university to provide the 
depth of analysis of these factors to make the most informed 
decision.  These realities become even starker when university 
leadership and its advisors over-emphasize monetary gains and 
engender an over-developed fear of giving away too much.  As a 
result, it sometimes becomes too easy to default to a “one-size-
fits-all” approach to intellectual property, even 
unintentionally.160 
Uniform approaches can help ensure that the university 
pursues core positions on various contractual, economic, and 
liability matters.  Templates and forms can expedite 
transactions if the underlying terms are generally reasonable 
                                                          
 158. Nancy Gallini & Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual Property: When Is It 
the Best Incentive System?, in 2 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 51, 66 
(Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds., 2002) (“What matters is the effective life, that is, the 
time until the noninfringing substitute appears.  The effective life is 
determined by patent scope or leading breadth, which is interpreted as the 
minimum quality improvement that avoids infringement.”) (citation omitted). 
 159. MOWERY ET AL., supra note 19, at 191; Moore et al., supra note 127, at 
2. 
 160. Siegel Study, supra note 29, at 33–35 (indentifying that the industry 
reports dissatisfaction with university technology transfer office marketing 
and negotiation skills and lack of business skills and expertise, both of which, 
they complain, cause university to focus too narrowly on a small set of 
technical areas, be too concerned about legal aspects of licensing, and cause 
universities to exercise intellectual property rights too aggressively given the 
circumstances). 
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and context-appropriate.  They also can facilitate clarity and 
consistency; after all, not every transaction needs every detail 
to be negotiated.  Creative commons, science commons, 
varieties of open source, and other resources can help in those 
circumstances.  Unfortunately, uniform strategies for 
intellectual property can over-protect the underlying 
innovation, and they can instill a false sense of entrenchment 
that delays the university in changing core positions when 
circumstances dictate.161  Agreement may eventually be 
reached, but frequently those involved are frustrated and have 
devoted too much time and money. 
That perspective can lead to difficult, unwieldy, and time 
consuming negotiations that increase costs for all involved, 
another complaint that has survived from the pre-Bayh-Dole 
era.  Those costs are part of the calculus that business and 
other potential “buyers” (including other universities) will use 
to determine if it is worthwhile to pursue a relationship.162  
Ironically, transaction costs that are beyond what is reasonable 
can undermine the university’s revenue motive because of 
expenses incurred and opportunities lost. 
Consequently, the one-size-fits-all approach too frequently 
leads to negative situations, each of which may undermine 
advancing innovation efforts generally.163  First, researchers 
may circumvent the university and directly approach acquirers, 
                                                          
 161. See BOK, supra note 31, at 141; SIEGEL STUDY, supra note 29, at 29–
30; Siegel, supra note 30, at 123; WASHBURN, supra note 47, at 191 
(“[Universities] ‘want the big payoff . . . but they don’t want to take any risk.’”) 
(quoting Thomas Burger, vice president for corporate development at Genta 
Inc.); WASHBURN, supra note 47, at 193 (“[U]niversities . . . overestimat[e] the 
commercial value of their inventions, and [take an] aggressive stance in 
licensing negotiations.”) (citing 1991 GUIRR study on industry perspectives). 
 162. NILSSON ET AL., supra note 35, at 15–17; see also MOWERY ET AL., 
supra note 19, at 84 (noting the high cost of patent management and its effect 
on potential financial return); PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL 2003, supra note 1, at 11, 
13 (cautioning institutions to beware of time and costs incurred to execute 
agreements, as they are “not inconsequential” and need to be reduced). 
 163. E.g.,Gallini & Scotchmer, supra note 158, at 67 (recognizing the 
debate that intellectual property policies “can stifle innovation and slow 
progress”) (citation omitted) (1990); see also PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL 2008, supra 
note 12, at 1, 4, 33 (“there is no ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach for creating a 
successful research partnership” or for “strengthening connection points 
between parties”).  But see Crow, supra note 13 at 24 (“Arizona State 
University has developed licensing templates and master sponsored research 
agreements, which can reduce the need to negotiate over terms and 
conditions”). 
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licensees, or investors.  Furthermore, they might even leave the 
university.  Second, innovations may stagnate.  Finally, the 
university may implement inflexible policies and behaviors that 
sometimes may work, sometimes inhibit, and frequently are 
not conducive to advancing innovation.  In the first instance, 
the university may lose out on opportunities.  In the latter two 
instances, both the university and society lose the benefits that 
might be available from the research outcomes.  None of these 
results are desirable. 
Some advocate that all university innovations should be 
given away freely and without reservation or charge.  In certain 
instances, this or other open system approaches may be 
appropriate, and they should be considered as a legitimate 
strategic alternative for select innovations, particularly when 
open collaborations and open innovation systems present 
opportunities to solve research challenges and more rapidly 
advance innovations to address problems in society.164 
However, as a blanket, wholesale, one-size-fits-all approach to 
all university advances, the nearly 100-year-old observations of 
Frank Gardner Cotrell, one of the visionaries and founders of 
The Research Corporation, remains valid: innovations that 
could better the human condition have not reached fruition 
when given away freely because there is no financial return to 
be expected to justify the additional expenditure and risk.165 
Importantly, increased engagement by private foundations, 
wealthy individuals, and public charities dedicated to research 
in certain areas, including through grants, program related 
investments, and direct investment, could result in more 
significant opportunities and capital needed for development 
and distribution.166 
                                                          
 164. See PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL 2008, supra note 12, at 3. Among the 
factors that a university might consider in making innovations freely available 
are the nature of the innovation and the nature of the proposed use.  For 
instance, it might be appropriate to make certain software, technology, and 
even pharmaceutical or biomedical advances broadly available in order to 
encourage and speed up their further development and commercialization. 
Also, it might be appropriate to charge for certain innovations but make them 
freely available when used for purposes of educational or scientific research. 
 165. MOWERY ET AL., supra note 19, at 59 (“[A] number of meritorious 
patents given to the public absolutely freely by their inventors have never 
come upon the market chiefly because ‘what is everybody’s business is 
nobody’s business.’”) (quoting F.G. Cottrell, The Research Corporation, an 
Experiment in the Public Administration of Patent Rights, 4 J. INDUS. & 
ENGINEERING CHEMISTRY 864, 865 (1912)). 
 166. See PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL 2008, supra note 12, at 1, 5 (acknowledging 
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As a matter of implementing federal policy, universities 
that succeed in advancing their innovations usually have 
already considered many of these alternatives, have connected 
with appropriate expertise, and are efficient at prioritizing and 
allocating resources to make the innovations as available as 
possible whether through patents, licenses, open source, 
publication, or other routes. 
2. Liability, Representations and Warranties, Indemnity 
Liability, indemnification, and sovereign immunity can be 
among the hardest and most difficult issues to address when 
advancing university innovations.  Principles of academic 
freedom and the purported inability to control faculty and to 
provide oversight or demand accountability are regular 
justifications for “never” making representations or warranties 
about originality or non-infringement, or “always” diluting 
these provisions.  Universities also rely on these same 
principles and claimed inabilities to assert that they “never” 
indemnify or defend even for their own behavior.167  
Many institutions promulgate these default positions 
despite being in the best position to monitor researcher 
activities, obtain representations and warranties from the 
researcher, and impose meaningful remedies against the 
researcher in case of breach.  Moreover, universities frequently 
receive additional amounts—sometimes substantial—as part of 
grants to cover administrative costs, some part of which could 
be used to monitor or supervise researchers enough to provide 
proper representations and warranties.168  It can be 
                                                          
trend of increased involvement by private foundations funding research, 
particularly in medicine and healthcare); see also I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 
200603031 (Oct. 25, 2005), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
wd/0603031.pdf.  A few high profile examples include the various activities 
and strategies of the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, Michael J. Fox 
Foundation for Parkinson’s Research, Milken Family Foundation, Prostate 
Cancer Foundation, the Omidyar Network, Google Foundation, Faster Cures, 
and others. 
 167. See Ritchie de Larena, supra note 10, at 1405 (quoting the President 
of the University of Utah in 1994 as asserting that it would be “an impossible 
and self-defeating approach” for universities to monitor the actions and 
veracity of its faculty). 
 168. See Ritchie de Larena, supra note 10, at 1405–06 (stating that 
taxpayers can legitimately expect universities to “comply not only with correct 
font on a cover page, but also proper monitoring, including at the 
departmental level where fellow researchers and department chairs are most 
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disconcerting when a university is not willing to support its 
own personnel, who are presumably motivated by academic 
integrity, reputation, job security, future job prospects, and/or 
even pecuniary interest.  A university suggesting that industry 
or a licensee university should obtain representations, 
warranties, and protections from the researcher are little or no 
comfort, especially when the licensor will not rely on the 
researcher in the first instance. 
In essence, universities that take these types of positions 
seem to want the benefits of the research, frequently paid for 
by others, without the responsibility or risk associated with 
what it takes to achieve those benefits.  Not only might they try 
to actively shift that responsibility and risk to others but they 
also frequently refuse to compensate the other party for their 
increased exposure by reducing fees or royalty rates, or altering 
use rights or other restrictions to better account for the shifted 
risk. 
Ultimately, universities have an abiding interest in 
protecting reputations and relationships.  A university with a 
reputation for permitting infringing material or content may 
suffer educational consequences because they will have 
difficulty attracting and retaining high quality faculty and 
students, and the non-economic benefits of university 
relationships with industry are jeopardized.  They may also 
suffer economically, through lost tuition revenue, sponsored 
research opportunities, and even charitable donations, and 
relationships with industry and community will suffer, 
resulting in lost contributions. 
Consequently, universities are concerned about ensuring 
originality, non-infringement, and other legal compliance—
regardless of the circumstances.169  Universities do have 
recourse when confronted with evidence of plagiarism, fraud, 
harassment, or any number of other behaviors that offend 
ethical, moral, or legal standards.  Despite objections from 
academia based on academic freedom or lack of control or 
oversight, universities are able to mete out consequences when 
they have the will to do so.170 
                                                          
likely to be able to vouch for their colleagues with some knowledge and 
confidence”). 
 169. See CREST Report, supra note 18, at 19 (good technology transfer 
offices “define, secure, and document the rights to background knowledge” and 
“obtain written assignments from students and researchers”). 
 170. See Jaschik, supra note 71 (academic panel found faculty member 
TYLER.WEB 2/20/2009  4:18:10 PM 
198 MINN J.L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 10:1 
 
 
As a practical matter, refusing to provide certain 
customary representations or warranties or to indemnify or 
defend against harm caused by their own behavior may not 
alter the university’s exposure much.  The absence of these 
provisions in a contract may save the university from 
responsibility to a licensee, but the university may still be 
liable directly to an injured party for infringement, tort, or 
otherwise where joint and several liability may be its only 
remaining shield.  Meanwhile, the university’s reputation and 
relationships may suffer in at least two meaningful ways: first, 
because it tolerated the infringing behavior or unethical 
research; and second, for its positions in negotiating the license 
and trying to shift responsibility for its behavior.  In the end, 
the university may still be financially liable to the same degree 
as if its contract included the representations and warranties 
and/or the duties to indemnify and defend.  However, its 
economic damages may be greater because of the damage to 
reputation and relationships.  As a result, attempts by 
universities to justify intransigence on liability issues by 
invoking academic freedom, lack of control, or administrative 
costs generally are strained, except possibly for statutory 
mandates relating to sovereign immunity. 
Principles of sovereign immunity and corresponding 
legislation often dictate what state universities can or cannot 
do in making representations, warranties and covenants, or in 
agreeing to indemnify or defend. 
With regard to originality and non-infringement, these 
matters are normally addressed in representations and 
warranties.  Absent waiver, however, sovereign immunity 
protects states and their subdivisions, including universities, 
from liability for infringing another’s intellectual property 
rights.171  This is not a level playing field for private 
universities, who must develop their negotiating strategies 
(including price) to consider their exposure to infringement 
claims by the licensee and third parties.  As a result, private 
universities are less able to decrease pricing or demonstrate 
                                                          
guilty of plagiarism and other charges but divided about punishment); Knight 
& Austen, supra note 71, at 203 (about forty percent of complaints resulted in 
some action to redress misconduct such as plagiarism or harassment). 
 171. See Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 
527 U.S. 666 (1999); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. 
Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999). 
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flexibility in other ways because of the exposure they must 
account for.  Public universities are freer to disregard 
intellectual property rights, which could make dealing with 
public universities more expensive for the licensees.  In 
addition, it may be argued that the lack of consequences for 
infringement by state institutions decreases their motivation to 
appropriately monitor their researchers. 
The advantages that sovereign immunity affords public 
universities are not limited to infringement.  They may also 
rely on this doctrine in a products liability context.  Although 
affording additional protections to the public university, 
sovereign immunity can be a disadvantage if there is 
reluctance to license innovations from such institutions because 
of the increased liability exposure to the licensee. 
Compromises to sovereign immunity that would create 
limited exposure and reforms in liability exposure of private 
universities and licensees could facilitate usefulness of 
university innovations.  For instance, setting aside sovereign 
immunity or permitting degrees to hold harmless agreements 
to allocate some risk to the university can encourage greater 
accountability regarding researchers and can provide some 
financial comfort to licensees.  Additionally, the exposure could 
be capped except in the case of gross negligence or intentional 
or willful misconduct.  After all, some degrees of liability 
exposure can impose accountability and inhibit recklessness.  
Similar provisions could help protect private universities that 
act in good faith and level the playing field for public and 
private institutions. 
Because of the amounts of federal money involved in 
supporting research and its distribution without regard to the 
character of an institution as private or public, a federal policy 
that desires maximal utilization and commercialization would 
oppose broad application of sovereign immunity as a deterrent 
to proper allocation of risk and a deterrent to expedited 
advancement of university innovation.  Reforms along these 
lines could provide a degree of certainty to universities and 
industry (and their respective insurers) that would help better 
quantify risk, more concretely defines potential consequences, 
and still ensures that injured parties are not left without 
recourse. 
As it stands now, principles of sovereign immunity may not 
be negotiable in many circumstances but only to the degree to 
which the principles apply.  Unfortunately, there have been 
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instances borne of misunderstanding, ignorance or desire to 
deceive to overstate the actual degree to which the public 
university is immune, including by mischaracterizing 
university policy (from which they may deviate) as covered by 
sovereign immunity (from which they may not, depending on 
the state).  Such mischaracterizations can negatively influence 
the university’s credibility and integrity, whether in acquiring 
innovations, sponsoring research, or even making donations. 
In addressing these challenging issues, successful 
universities do not segregate them from other issues.  They 
recognize that relationships exist among and between 
negotiated topics.  For instance, the monetary value of the 
intellectual property rights being granted may be less than 
otherwise expected in the absence of the university’s ability to 
provide satisfactory representations and warranties or to 
address liability, indemnity, and related issues.  There may be 
other ways to creatively compensate for the increased risk that 
the university is shifting to the licensee or assignee, such as 
permitting a longer term, favoring exclusivity or loosening 
certain conditions associated with exclusivity, broadening the 
geographic scope, allowing alternative media of expression and 
uses, and expanding rights regarding derivative works.  
Unfortunately, many of these opportunities can be lost because 
of how universities sometimes staff negotiations. 
Clarity of responsibility for decision-making on these and 
other legal topics can be critical, and its absence can inhibit 
advancing innovation efforts.  As noted in one of the examples 
at the beginning of this section, transactions around advancing 
university innovations can involve multiple arms of the 
university with frequently disparate, unilateral views but 
unclear means for reconciling these views.  This bureaucracy 
can permit people to abdicate responsibility or inhibit the 
ability to make decisions, absent time consuming consensus 
building.  This behavior and competing policy perspectives can 
be as frustrating to the university’s personnel as it is to those 
with whom it negotiates. 
Clear authority should be vested appropriately, ideally in 
one person who is knowledgeable and readily accessible for 
negotiations, so that such person can assess the risks and 
benefits associated with various options and circumstances, 
and she or he can make legal, business, and practical decisions. 
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B. POLICY AND BEHAVIOR: PRACTICAL TOPICS 
There are at least two practical topics that can reflect more 
broadly on how a university satisfies federal policy and 
contractual obligations to advance its innovations: disclosures 
and measuring efforts. 
1. Disclosures 
Disclosures to technology transfer offices of inventions, 
innovations, technologies, discoveries, etc., are the foundation 
of the university’s advancing innovation programs. People 
responsible for such programs must know about the 
innovations available for transfer. Unfortunately, not enough 
innovations with commercial or other useful potential are 
disclosed.172 
The following chart shows information reported to the 
Association of University and Technology Transfer, the 
affiliation group for technology transfer personnel, about 
researcher disclosures, new patent applications by universities, 
and patents issued to universities for 2004, 2005, and 2006.173 
 
 2004 2005 2006 
Disclosures 16,871 17,382 18,874 
New Patent 
Applications 
10,517 10,270 11,622 
Patents Issued 3,680 3,278 3,255 
  
According to a study by Jerry and Marie Thursby, sixty-
four percent of faculty surveyed made no disclosures during the 
years studied, and about fifteen percent made disclosures in 
only one year within those studied.174  Therefore, only twenty-
one percent of surveyed faculty made disclosures in two or more 
of the years studied.  It is hard to believe that there are not 
more innovations that should be disclosed.  More should be 
done to encourage and facilitate such disclosures. 
Universities can increase disclosures by implementing 
                                                          
 172. See Thursby, supra note 1, at 214. See infra note 176 for a chart 
representing information reported to the Association of University and 
Technology Transfer, the affiliation group for technology transfer personnel, 
about researcher disclosures, new patent applications by universities, and 
patents issued to universities in 2004, 2005, and 2006. 
 
 174. Thursby & Thursby, supra note 98, at 200. 
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policies and pursuing behavior that motivates and removes 
barriers to disclosure.175 Research suggests that scientists and 
researchers are motivated by professional prestige and 
recognition;176 monetary rewards that lead to better equipment, 
facilities, support and availability for research opportunities;177 
licensing potential and money for their own personal use;178 the 
propagation, dissemination, and exchange of ideas;179 access to 
platforms for testing their ideas;180 constructive changes in the 
curricula;181 advances in benefits to human welfare;182 and even 
enhanced job prospects for their students.183 
It is not necessarily a novel suggestion that those involved 
should appeal to these motivating influences by including 
rewards for behavior consistent with the desired goals for 
                                                          
 175. See Siegel & Phan, supra note 35, at 3, 25; PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL 
2008, supra note 12, at 21 (“Misalignment of incentive systems and a lack of 
transparency can create barriers for university-private sector research 
partnerships.”); see also PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL 2008, supra note 12, at 21 
(universities should connect outputs to incentive systems for faculty, 
technology transfer office personnel and administrators); PRESIDENT’S 
COUNCIL 2008, supra note 12, at 34 (encouraging flexibility in tenure 
processes to acknowledge the importance of and commitment of time to 
university-industry relationships); PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL 2008, supra note 12, 
at 35 (tenure decisions often fail to recognize critical factors other than 
publications and Federal grant money; technology transfer personnel should 
be assessed on their value added or volume of products or knowledge moved 
instead of revenue generated; and recognizing need for Federal agencies and 
universities to provide incentives for “industry participation, entrepreneurship 
activities and fostering State and local involvement”). 
 176. SIEGEL STUDY, supra note 22, at 10–11, 49 tbl.1; see also TORNATZKY 
ET AL., supra note 19, at 19 (stating that universities with external economic 
and industry partners often reward faculty involvement with these partners 
with acknowledgment and accolades). 
 177. Siegel, supra note 30, at 130; NILSSON ET AL., supra note 35, at 43; 
SIEGEL STUDY, supra note 29, at 31; see also Strandburg, supra note 49, at 95 
(at the margin, scientists more likely to respond to opportunities for greater 
scientific productivity and autonomy than wealth). 
 178. NILSSON ET AL., supra note 35, at 43; see also SIEGEL STUDY, supra 
note 29, at 32. 
 179. See Siegel & Phan, supra note 35, at 5; see also Siegel, supra note 30, 
at 130 (finding that technology transfer improves university scientists’ 
research through access to the ideas of industry scientists). 
 180. NILSSON ET AL., supra note 35, at 43. 
 181. See Siegel, supra note 23, at 130. 
 182. See NILSSON ET AL., supra note 35, at 43 (“[University] researchers are 
more driven by research than money.”); see also id. at 28 (noting that a factor 
motivating Japanese researchers is putting research to practical use to benefit 
society). 
 183. NILSSON ET AL., supra note 35, at 43; Libecap, supra note 27, at ix. 
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technology transfer programs.  Some rewards seem fairly easy 
to implement, such as promoting publication and 
presentations,184 adopting generous standards for sharing 
royalties, license fees, and equity stakes in companies,185 or 
recognizing in tenure and promotion the validity of disclosures, 
patents and other behavior that advances technology 
transfer.186  Most universities seem to implement some 
combination of these to varying degrees, but greater efforts are 
needed. 
At the same time, universities should address perceived 
barriers to disclosure, including threats to academic integrity, 
concern that disclosure may take time and energy away from 
research, and fear that disclosure may require researchers to 
become enmeshed in bureaucratic, inefficient, and 
uncomfortable patenting, licensing and commercializing 
processes.187 
In addition, when university leaders overtly focus on 
revenue, researchers may believe that they will not receive 
meaningful attention equivalent to their efforts, unless 
disclosing an obviously lucrative innovation. As a result, 
researchers may refrain from disclosing innovations that are 
not clear financial home runs because they believe doing so will 
be unlikely to matter.  Those realities and perceptions can 
change if university behavior changes. 
Incentives and disincentives for disclosure and university 
approaches to them can be among the best evidence of whether 
universities prioritize advancing their innovations and 
fulfilling their federal policy obligations.  To some degree, game 
                                                          
 184. See SIEGEL STUDY, supra note 29, at 10–11 (asserting that publication 
and conference presentations are primary motives for university scientists); 
see also TORNATZKY ET AL., supra note 2, at 53, 89 (citing practices of North 
Carolina State University and  Purdue University). But see id. at 166 (citing 
practices at Stanford University). 
 185. See SIEGEL STUDY, supra note 29, at 32. 
 186. See id. But see Philip M. Pizzo, M.D., Panel Discussion: Research, 
Innovation, and Safety: Doing the Right Thing, 74 CLEV. CLINIC J. MED. 
(SUPP.) S16, S19 (2007) (asserting that aligning tenure decisions with patents 
“is a misuse of scholarship because it skews things in a way that misses the 
opportunity for fundamental discovery”). 
 187. See Richard Jensen et al., The Disclosure and Licensing of University 
Inventions 2, (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9734, 2003) 
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w9734.pdf?new_window=1; see also 
Thursby & Thursby, supra note 98, at 189 (discussing the failure of faculty to 
disclose because of possible publication delay, time required for industry 
research and development, and perceptions regarding the roles of academic 
scientists and engineers). 
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theorists and economists alike might persuasively contend that 
motivating disclosure is a matter of demonstrating that it is 
worthwhile and better than the next, best alternative, which 
might be non-disclosure, circumvention, or even departure.188 
Therefore, high performing, entrepreneurial universities must 
make sure (1) that incentives make disclosure worthwhile and 
(2) that disincentives are minimal and exist only as needed. 
Successfully increasing disclosures should generate enough 
quality content for universities to reliably account for their 
compliance with federal policy and the expenditure of public 
money.  Disclosures can provide this through 
commercialization and pursuit of monetary, educational, 
humanitarian, and other benefits that flow from the entrance of 
quality research into the advancing innovation pipeline. 
2. Measures of Success 
As noted in Part II.A, universities in the United States do 
not operate in a purely manufacturing economy that measures 
success linearly.189  It is no longer just a matter of objective 
inputs yielding predictable outputs. Unfortunately, many of the 
measures associated with technology transfer from universities 
have remained linear, which is unsurprising if revenue is the 
primary objective.190  To evaluate advancing innovation inputs, 
universities look to “income” generated by sponsored research, 
                                                          
 188. Jensen et al., supra note 187, at 10–11; see also Strandburg, supra 
note 49, at 108–09 (suggesting that disclosures occur when revenues from 
patenting a discovery outweigh any opportunity costs or penalties for violating 
norms). 
 189. See supra notes 24–26 and accompanying text; see also PRESIDENT’S 
COUNCIL 2008, supra note 12, at 1-2, 7, 31 (recognizing the changing paradigm 
from a linear innovation pathway to a “dynamic ecosystem” that is non-linear, 
or less linear, more complex, and iterative). 
 190. As Siegel and his colleagues note business places significant value on 
some of the more informal paths for technology transfer. Siegel, supra note 30, 
at 127; Siegel, supra note 31, at 130–131; see also MOWERY ET AL., supra note 
19, at 5 (discussing findings that patents and licenses are less important to 
industry for knowledge exchange than other channels such as publications and 
conference presentations); Libecap, supra note 27, at xi–xii (“[U]niversities 
influence industrial innovation through . . . interacting informally and in 
conferences with industry researchers . . . .”). It will help technology transfer 
personnel build trust with faculty and researchers if they recognize the 
importance of these measures and can facilitate, or at least accommodate 
these opportunities to the extent possible. See supra notes 127–130 and 
accompanying text. 
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grant activity, and disclosures.191  To measure outputs, they 
frequently seem to calculate the following: 
a. number of patent applications, patents, and licenses 
or assignments; 
b. revenue generated from license fees, royalties, 
options, and cashed in equity; 
c. new products introduced to the market; and 
d. number of business start-ups begun and ongoing. 
Not surprisingly, the above list contains indicators that 
most readily reflect that money is the goal that university 
leaders have for advancing innovation.192  All of these are 
relevant indicators of some level of activity and effort, and the 
information should continue to be gathered and used 
appropriately. However, these measures do not most accurately 
reflect how universities implement federal policy or most fully 
account for the expenditure of tax dollars.  Examining 
disclosure figures illustrates this point. 
Using only the numbers available for fiscal year 2006, 
which saw about $45.4 billion in sponsored research, 
universities appear to have spent approximately $2.4 million in 
research per disclosure, $3.9 million per new patent 
application, and $14 million per patent.193  However, it is 
                                                          
 191. See, e.g., AUTM 2006, supra note 78, at 20, 24 (reporting sponsored 
research dollars and disclosures). 
 192. See supra notes 112–114 and accompanying text. 
 193. The chart below presents data available from AUTM for 2004-2006. It 
also presents a financial relationship between those outputs and the amount 
expended within each given year rounded to the nearest dollar. 
 2004 2005 2006 
Disclosures 16,871 17,382 18,874 
New Patent 
Applications 
10,517 10,270 11,622 
Patents Issued 3,680 3,278 3,255 
    
Sponsored Research 
Dollars 
$41.245 billion $42.3 billion $45.4 billion 




$2,444,728 $2,433,552 $2,405,425 
Research Spending 
Per New Patent 
Application 
(calculated) 
$3,921,746 $4,118,793 $3,906,384 
TYLER.WEB 2/20/2009  4:18:10 PM 
206 MINN J.L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 10:1 
 
 
critical to remember that these ratios at best are only 
illustrative because the outputs counted in 2006 most likely 
arose from research dollars expended in and aggregated over 
multiple preceding years.  We probably get closer to actual 
ratios by calculating outputs in 2006 as a function of 
expenditures in 2004 and 2005, which yields an expenditure 
per disclosure ratio about twice as high as the amount based on 
2006 research dollars.  Accurate data is not available from 
which to make reliable calculations or assessments of how 
research spending correlates to the above activities.  However, 
the possible difference in disclosure ratios should demonstrate 
how deficient and unreliable this information can be as a 
purported measure of the outputs of technology transfer efforts. 
Even considering the seemingly ubiquitous measure of 
licensing revenue, the relationship to spending is similarly 
distorted and ill-informed. Using AUTM’s 2006 reported 
revenue as an example and unrealistically assuming that a 
relationship exists between 2006 revenue and research 
expenditures in the same year, the financial return on the 
taxpayer’s investment appears to be about four percent.194 
Recognizing that it is more likely that expenditures in prior 
years seeded the revenues received in 2006, that return is 
reduced by half if 2006 revenue is compared against aggregated 
research expenditures for both 2004 and 2005.195 As a pure 
financial matter, two to four percent returns are not acceptable 
outputs or results. 
There also is a temptation to suggest that these ratios 
could support the statements at the beginning of this article 
                                                          
Research Spending 
Per Patent Issued 
(calculated) 
$11,207,880 $12,904,210 $13,947,773 
 
AUTM 2004, supra note 105, at 2, 15, 16, 18, 19; AUTM 2005, supra note 78, 
at 13, 22, 26, 28; AUTM 2006, supra note 78, at 5, 20, 24 25. 
 194. See AUTM 2006, supra note 78, at 5, 20, 38–44. To arrive at this 
figure, we totaled the amounts provided by the universities to AUTM for the 
2006 study regarding revenue generated from their advancing innovation 
efforts and divided that amount by the amount spent on research.  AUTM last 
provided a total on revenue in its 2004 survey.  In that survey, AUTM 
reported $1.385 billion in net licensing revenue and about $41.245 billion in 
research expenditures. AUTM 2004, supra note 105 at 2, 3, 14, 24–25.  Using 
those amounts, we can calculate a “return” of about 3.35%. 
 195. See AUTM 2004, supra note 105, at 2, 24; AUTM 2005, supra note 78, 
at 5, 22, 42–47. 
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that university innovation advancement efforts generally are 
not reaching their potential.196  These calculations should not, 
however, be relied on except in concluding that they 
demonstrate the incompleteness of current measurements and 
the need for better ones.  For instance, none of the traditional 
indicators for assessing outputs account appropriately for  
benefits in economic growth and advances in human welfare, 
such as jobs created or retained, taxes paid, efficiencies gained, 
lives made more comfortable, and illnesses prevented or 
abated. 
The University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill (“UNC”) 
developed a technology to be used as an adjunct to the AIDS 
vaccine.197  Working through their start-up company and in 
collaboration with the University of Capetown in South Africa, 
UNC launched a clinical trial.198  Although there may be high 
demand for the adjunct, there is little economic reward UNC 
can expect.199  Using traditional measures of success, this effort 
by UNC might measure a “one” in licenses granted. It is 
unlikely to reach materiality in terms of revenue when 
measured against the University’s annual budget. Given those 
realities, some might contend that it was not worth the time, 
energy, or effort to make this technology available under 
traditional measurements.  UNC believed otherwise.  Given the 
number of lives that could be improved or even saved, this 
innovation could be considered a “home run” under alternative 
performance measures. 
To its credit, AUTM also recognizes limitations of data on 
patents, disclosures and research dollars, and desires new 
indicators that better assess the fruits of advancing innovation 
efforts.200  John Fraser, President of AUTM when it published 
                                                          
 196. See supra pp. 1–2. 
 197. Mark Crowell, The Changing Face of University Technology Transfer, 
in EWING MARION KAUFFMAN FOUNDATION, KAUFFMAN FOUNDATION 
THOUGHTBOOK  2005, at 107, 110 (2005). 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. 
 200. See id. at 109 (“[T]raditional measures are problematic.”); id. at 110 
(citing AUTM discussions about developing “more important and more 
substantive measures”); Ben Butkus, Questioning Licensing Revenue As 
Measure of Success, AUTM, Others Seek Alternatives, BIOTECH TRANSFER 
WEEK (December 10, 2007), 
http://www.biotechtransferweek.com/issues/1_39/features/143878-1.html; see 
also PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL 2008, supra note 12, at 4, 25. 34 (“few robust 
measures and quantitative asessements exist” and “more robust metrics are 
needed to describe the actual inputs, outputs, outcomes, and impacts of the 
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its FY2005 study, described the AUTM board’s work “to 
identify additional, new metrics to measure impact and 
outcomes of our activities.”201 Mr. Fraser also explained 
AUTM’s interim efforts to tell more of the story by featuring 
success stories in its report “to more clearly illustrate the 
results—the benefits—of the tech transfer process.”202  Patrick 
Jones, Ph.D., AUTM’s President upon publication of its FY2006 
study, similarly reflected that “[t]he impact of technology 
transfer is not in mere numbers reflecting the activities of 
offices, but rather in the benefit to the public . . . .”203 Dr. Jones 
continued that “these numbers are just a part of the actual 
contributions from research performed . . . .”204 
As discussed earlier in the context of a vision that drives 
behavior, using linear standards as a primary measure of 
activity can communicate how the university and its leaders 
view advancing innovation and the priority, or lack thereof, 
that they place on doing so.205  If advancing innovation is to 
serve the overall mission of the university and fulfill federal 
policy, additional measurements consistent with such an 
approach should be adopted.206  Those measurements might 
                                                          
R&D enterprise”). 
 201. AUTM 2005, supra note 78, at 4. 
 202. Id. 
 203. AUTM 2006, supra note 78, at 4. 
 204. Id. 
 205. See Crowell, supra note 197, at 109–10 (explaining that a focus on 
dollars, or number of patents, license agreements, and disclosures can cause 
the university to lose sight of public benefit and economic benefit); Boettiger & 
Bennett, supra note 10, at 273 (“The focus by universities on . . . income 
generation has in part shaped the functioning of the U.S. technology transfer 
in United State system.”); id. at 280 (“performance metrics based on 
revenue . . . and numbers of patents and licenses, distorts decision-making 
process of technology transfer TTO staff”); Markman et al., supra note 11, at 
259 (stating that universities are pressured to show tangible returns to 
society); Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 114, at 306 (stating that technology 
transfer office personnel see their primary job as bringing in licensing 
revenue, and that it may be important in their performance assessment); see 
also PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL 2008, supra note 12, at 35 (standards to evaluate 
performance of university researchers and make tenure decisions “often fail to 
recognize other critical factors” because they rely primarily on publications 
and Federal grants; current metrics for incentives and reward systems “lack 
the flexibility to optimally support university-private sector partnerships and 
innovation”). 
 206. See MOWERY ET AL., supra note 19, at 178: 
To the extent that universities choose among these instruments 
carefully, and with the objective of facilitating use and 
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reflect the benefits of advancing innovation efforts in service to 
economic growth and human welfare, and might include the 
following: 
a. number of those who use innovations that emanate 
from universities; 
b. number of medical treatments administered; 
c. number of diseases treated; 
d. number of students engaged; 
e. number of lives saved or improved; 
f. number of jobs created or retained; 
g. total economic impact,207 including sales volume, 
revenue, and income and other taxes generated (and 
exempted because of tax status); 
h. regional economic development changes, and new 
businesses that might emerge in support of the new 
technology, products, or services; 
i. number and quality of social networks created, 
enhanced, and expanded; 
j. number of new collaborations developed; and 
k. amount of time involved with and total costs of 
licensing. 
Not all of these forms of measure will be useful or even 
make sense for every innovation or university, and there 
certainly are others that could be added.  The point is that 
there should be discussions about including less linear, non-
standardized measures that will better account for resources 
                                                          
commercialization rather than maximizing royalty income, patents 
and licenses can advance the mission of the university-industry 
technology transfer while maintaining the other important missions 
of public and private universities in the United States. 
See also PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL 2003, supra note 1, at 11 (Stating that metrics 
to quantify program effectiveness are needed and “must take into account a 
wide range of steps in a highly complex process”); MOWERY ET AL., supra note 
19, at 190 (“A single-minded focus on patenting and licensing as the only 
important or effective channels for technology transfer is unrealistic and may 
produce policies that limit the effectiveness of other channels that are more 
important . . . .”); see also PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL 2008, supra note 12, at 4 
(advocating for metrics of technology innovation, workforce, and productivity) 
and 21 (“development of new technologies and creation of human capital”). 
 207. See SCHACHT, 32076, supra note 2, at 16 (reporting that estimated 
returns to society from investment in basic research are twice those received 
by industry, and include increased revenues from taxes on profits, new jobs 
created, improved productivity, and economic growth); SCHACHT, 30320, supra 
note 2, at 10 (“[B]ringing new products, processes, and services to the 
marketplace can generate economic growth in the form of new jobs, [and] 
greater productivity . . . .”). 
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and allow universities to encourage those positioned to advance 
innovations.  These types of indicators may even help increase 
disclosures as researchers realize that their innovations have 
practical effects beyond money. 
Finally, technology and society have changed. What 
previously might have been pursued as strictly proprietary 
(consistent with the manufacturing approach), may now more 
reasonably be treated as open source in certain industries and 
research focus areas.  Although not easily subject to the 
traditional, linear standards of measure, open source, Creative 
Commons, Science Commons, and other approaches to 
intellectual property can be meaningful and influential. New 
approaches demand additional measures of performance to 
account for the impact of such advancements. 
New approaches also may help delineate gains made 
against the inventory of stagnant creativity mired in 
laboratories, drawers, and shelves.  Current standards of 
measure do tell us that innovation is being advanced, but they 
do not provide much information about whether potential is 
being reached or whether the university, its researchers, and 
society as a whole are receiving reasonably robust benefits from 
the fruits of federally funded university research.  There may 
be a certain naiveté about this vision, but without considering 
it among the benchmarks of achievement, universities will only 
be able to tell whether they have increased from prior years. 
Beating last year’s numbers may be progress, but it does not 
mean that federal policy has been implemented or that returns 
have been maximized on the tens of billions of dollars spent 
each year on research.208 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Far too many meaningful university innovations lie 
dormant and under-utilized.209  Given the amount of money 
spent annually to further university research and the relatively 
low levels of quantitative return,210 one can argue that this 
under-utilization creates enormous waste, unrealized potential, 
and even moral failure. Among these innovations may lie more 
                                                          
 208. See, e.g., AUTM 2006 supra note 78, at 5 (“Universities received $45 
billion plus in R&D expenditures . . . .”). 
 209. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
 210. See supra notes 189–191 and accompanying text. 
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effective ways to cure, treat, and prevent disease; ways to 
better conserve, exploit or replenish natural resources; 
technologies that allow us to better understand science; or any 
number of other useful discoveries.  We need sustained efforts 
to advance university innovations as envisioned by federal 
policy. 
Some have suggested that reversing or modifying Bayh-
Dole can produce the results Congress intended.211  Such an 
approach may be unworkable for practical reasons, including 
the need to address the fact that various other governmental 
and private sources also fund the same research and have their 
own expectations.  As a policy matter, it may be better to 
address deficiencies elsewhere in the commercialization and 
utilization processes.  For instance, in light of the growing 
number of 501(c)(3) organizations interested in medical and 
health care advances, it might be useful to change federal 
policies for some period of time to make it easier for such 
organizations to invest resources at intermediate stages of 
development.212   The government could also offer tax 
incentives to for profit enterprises investing at that stage, 
thereby bridging the current “valley of death” to “increase 
economic welfare and the productivity of government R&D 
investment.”213  Alternative treatment of investments by 
501(c)(3) and for profit organizations in enterprises building 
substantially on university innovations may serve similar 
purposes.  While policy makers and others consider these and 
other changes, universities that have not been as successful in 
advancing their innovations might pursue the suggestions in 
this article and other strategies for more fully implementing 
federal policy expressed in Bayh-Dole. 
Institutional transformations are hard work, take time, 
and involve risk.  Perpetuating the status quo, however, also 
carries risk, including that of denying society the benefits of an 
unacceptably large quantity of university research and 
innovation.  The rewards for engaging this work, taking this 
                                                          
 211. See Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 114, at 291 (arguing that funding 
agencies have a more appropriate combination of knowledge and incentives to 
decide intellectual property rights and that Bayh-Dole should be modified to 
allow them to determine when to dedicate federally funded research results to 
the public domain). 
 212. See supra notes 127, 166 and accompanying text for a discussion of 
the increasing interest of private foundations and other non-profit 
organizations in broadly utilizing and commercializing cures for disease. 
 213. Ford, supra note 17, at 36. 
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time, and accepting reasonable risks can transform economic 
possibilities and advance human welfare in ways we may not 
even be able to imagine yet.  Moreover, concerns about conflicts 
of interest and commitment, and other ethical dilemmas do not 
outweigh these benefits or the federal policy mandate.  They 
still must and can be managed in a balanced way that protects 
reputations and the actual as well as perceived credibility of 
research outcomes.  As a result, we should expect more. 
University leaders and others in academia and industry should 
do more to produce and demonstrate better returns—financial 
and otherwise—on the investment of taxpayer money. 
This can be done by ensuring that universities operate 
with a vision for advancing innovation that (i) complements the 
university’s academic and research missions and (ii) is 
informed by the institution’s research capacities and personnel, 
and realistic expectations about revenue potential and 
allocation of risk.  Vision alone, however, will not produce 
results.  Several universities have shown that results can 
follow when vision is implemented through corresponding 
policies and consistent behaviors that (i) pursue variable 
intellectual property strategies appropriate for the 
circumstances, (ii) properly allocate liability and risk, or 
compensate in other ways for misallocations, (iii) entice and 
reward researchers for their disclosures and their cooperation 
with the advancing innovation process, and (iv) more fully 
measure and explain the results of our nation’s investment in 
university research.  These responsibilities lie first and 
foremost with university leaders and their advisors, many of 
whom are from the legal profession. 
 
